County of Lancaster v. County of Custer
985 N.W.2d 612
Neb.2023Background
- Michael Taul, who listed a Broken Bow (Custer County) residence, applied for and received Lancaster County general assistance (May–Nov 2019), totaling roughly $31,422; he later became ineligible after receiving SSI.
- Lancaster mailed the statutory notice under the general-assistance statutes requesting removal and reimbursement from Custer County and later demanded payment; Custer’s board disallowed the claim under the county-claims statute (§23-135).
- Lancaster sued Custer in Lancaster County District Court under the general-assistance reimbursement statute (§68-145) seeking recovery for amounts expended on Taul.
- Custer asserted defenses including failure to comply with §23-135 and that Lancaster’s suit belonged in Custer County; the district court held it had subject-matter jurisdiction and granted summary judgment for Lancaster.
- Custer’s appeal failed to include a proper assignments-of-error section; the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed only for plain error, addressed jurisdiction and statutory interpretation, and affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over Lancaster’s reimbursement suit | Lancaster: §68-145 authorizes the county that furnished aid to sue the county of legal settlement; suit in district court is proper | Custer: §23-135 requires claims be filed with county clerk/board first and gives the county board exclusive original jurisdiction for claims against a county | Held: District court had jurisdiction; §68-145 provides a statutory route and §23-135 is not mandatory for statutory reimbursement claims |
| Whether Lancaster’s claim arises from contract (triggering §23-135) or from statute/quasi-contract | Lancaster: Liability is statutory/quasi-contractual (restitution) under the general-assistance statutes, not contractual | Custer: The assistance application and subrogation language show contractual or implied contractual basis, so §23-135 applies | Held: Claim is statutory/quasi-contractual, not a contract; §23-135 compliance is not mandatory |
| Whether Lancaster complied with the procedural requirements of the general-assistance statutes | Lancaster: It mailed the notice required by §68-144 and otherwise followed Chapter 68 procedures before suing under §68-145 | Custer: Asserted noncompliance and relied on board disallowance under §23-135 | Held: Lancaster complied with §68-144; that compliance supports its §68-145 suit |
| Whether any plain error requires reversal of the summary judgment given appellant’s deficient briefing | Lancaster: Evidence and undisputed compliance entitled it to judgment | Custer: Raised procedural and factual challenges but failed to properly assign errors on appeal | Held: No plain error; summary judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. County of Douglas, 223 Neb. 65 (1986) (county-claims procedure mandatory for claims arising in contract)
- United States Cold Storage v. City of La Vista, 285 Neb. 579 (2013) (statutory rights are presumed noncontractual absent clear legislative intent)
- Frontier County v. Lincoln County, 121 Neb. 701 (1931) (county sought recovery after board rejection; historical practice of appealing board denial)
- Rock County v. Holt County, 78 Neb. 616 (1907) (similar precedent of county claim pursued after board disallowance)
- Otoe County v. Lancaster County, 78 Neb. 517 (1907) (county liability for support of poor is statutory)
- City of Scottsbluff v. Waste Connections of Neb., 282 Neb. 848 (2011) (definition and distinction of implied-in-fact contract)
- JB & Associates v. Nebraska Cancer Coalition, 303 Neb. 855 (2019) (statutory language given plain meaning)
- REO Enterprises v. Village of Dorchester, 312 Neb. 792 (2022) (appellate courts independently review questions of law)