244 A.3d 873
Pa. Commw. Ct.2020Background
- Andrew Ruffner, hired as a corrections officer trainee (May 2016) and CPR/First Aid trained, became a full officer in April 2017.
- On Sept. 17, 2017, Ruffner found an inmate hanging, cut him down, and—believing the inmate dead—waited outside the cell for the Assistant Director of Nursing (ADON), who was on the unit.
- The ADON delayed, did not begin resuscitation, and was later discharged by the County; the Medical Director arrived shortly after, administered CPR, briefly revived the inmate, who later died.
- The County terminated Ruffner for failing to perform required guard tours and for not immediately initiating lifesaving measures (CPR); the Union grieved and arbitrated.
- An arbitrator credited Ruffner’s belief the inmate was dead and the ADON’s presence as mitigating, reduced termination to a three-day suspension with reinstatement and back pay.
- The trial court vacated the award as violating public policy against inmate suicide; the Commonwealth Court reversed and reinstated the arbitrator’s award.
Issues
| Issue | County's Argument | Union's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the arbitrator’s award satisfies the CBA’s "essence" test | Award nonetheless undermines public safety and therefore should be set aside | Award rests within CBA scope and flows rationally from contract and facts | Parties agreed award satisfied the essence test; no dispute on this point |
| Whether a well-defined public policy against inmate suicide exists | A dominant public policy exists that bars an award that effectively minimizes accountability for failures leading to inmate death | Does not dispute the policy’s existence; argues award does not violate it given unique facts | Court: a well-defined public policy exists in Pennsylvania |
| Whether the arbitrator’s remedy (3-day suspension + reinstatement) compels violation of that public policy | The light penalty poses an unacceptable risk of undermining the public policy against inmate suicide and thus must be vacated | Remedy is fact-specific, acknowledges culpability, and is a permissible calibration of discipline given ADON’s presence and credited belief inmate was dead | Court: Under Millcreek three-part test, the remedy does not compel violation of public policy; award reinstated |
Key Cases Cited
- Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist. v. Millcreek Twp. Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n, 210 A.3d 993 (Pa. 2019) (articulates three-part test for applying the public-policy exception to arbitration awards)
- Westmoreland Intermediate Unit #7 v. Westmoreland Intermediate Unit #7 Classroom Assistants Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n, 939 A.2d 855 (Pa. 2007) (public-policy exception to essence test standards)
- Phila. Hous. Auth. v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Dist. Council 33, Local 934, 52 A.3d 1117 (Pa. 2012) (arbitration award vacated where reinstatement with back pay would eviscerate dominant public policy against sexual harassment)
- Neshaminy Sch. Dist. v. Neshaminy Fed’n of Tchrs., 171 A.3d 334 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (courts weigh aggravating and mitigating factors when assessing whether an award undermines public policy)
- Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, Farview State Hosp. v. Kallinger, 580 A.2d 887 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990) (recognizes strong public policy against suicide in certain institutional contexts)
- State Sys. of Higher Educ. v. State Coll. Univ. Pro. Ass’n (PSEA-NEA), 743 A.2d 405 (Pa. 1999) (describes the essence test for reviewing arbitration awards)
