Country Club Estates Condominium Association v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC
2017 IL App (1st) 162459
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- Bayview purchased a condominium at a judicial foreclosure sale (sheriff’s deed dated Nov. 21, 2014) whose prior owner had accumulated nearly $14,000 in unpaid assessments.
- Under 765 ILCS 605/9(g)(3), a foreclosure purchaser owes common-expense assessments "from and after the first day of the month after the date of the judicial foreclosure sale."
- The Association demanded payment (March 13, 2015) and sued for possession and ~$18,659.26 in unpaid assessments on April 27, 2015.
- Bayview tendered $4,771.85 on June 22, 2015 (payment limited to assessments accruing after Bayview’s purchase); the Association refused the partial tender.
- Bayview moved for partial summary judgment, arguing its postsale payment extinguished the Association’s lien for presale assessments under §9(g)(3); the trial court granted partial summary judgment for Bayview.
- The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that extinguishment requires "prompt" payment of postsale assessments and that Bayview’s seven-month delay raises a triable issue of fact.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §9(g)(3) requires prompt payment of postsale assessments to extinguish an association’s lien for presale assessments | Yes — 1010 Lake Shore requires a foreclosure buyer to make prompt payment; Bayview’s 7‑month delay is not prompt | No — plain text contains no timing requirement; buyer can pay postsale assessments at any time to extinguish lien | Court: Prompt payment is required; promptness is fact‑based and equitable, not mechanically satisfied by any delayed tender |
| Whether Bayview’s June 22, 2015 tender (7 months after acquiring title) extinguished the Association’s lien as a matter of law | The tender was not prompt and therefore did not extinguish the lien | The tender of postsale assessments (whenever made) extinguishes the lien under §9(g)(3) | Court: Summary judgment improper — material fact exists whether the 7‑month delay was "prompt"; remand for factual proceedings |
| Whether the court must follow 1010 Lake Shore’s discussion of promptness (even if characterized as dictum) and whether it applies retroactively | 1010 Lake Shore’s statement that §9(g)(3) incentivizes prompt payment is controlling; promptness applies here | The 1010 Lake Shore language is dicta and should not bind; if it does, it should not be applied retroactively to Bayview’s predecisional conduct | Court: Bound by 1010 Lake Shore; its promptness principle is consistent with the statute’s purpose and applies here (not a new rule), so retroactivity is not a bar |
Key Cases Cited
- 1010 Lake Shore Ass’n v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2015 IL 118372 (state supreme court’s interpretation that §9(g)(3) provides an incentive for prompt postsale payment to effect lien extinguishment)
- Pembrook Condominium Ass’n‑One v. North Shore Trust & Savings, 2013 IL App (2d) 130288 (postsale tender ~6 weeks after first due date held sufficient under §9(g)(3))
- 5510 Sheridan Road Condominium Ass’n v. U.S. Bank, 2017 IL App (1st) 160279 (interpreting the statutory phrase establishing when postsale liability begins and acknowledging legislative intent to encourage prompt payment)
- Exelon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 234 Ill. 2d 266 (appellate courts should follow Illinois Supreme Court dicta absent a contrary supreme court decision)