Cottrell v. Smith, 299 Ga. 517

Background

Cottrell, a public figure in running and Christian evangelism, was the subject of blog posts, list-serve emails, and Facebook messages by five defendants (the Crockers, Hugh Johnson, Peggy Smith, and Karen Smith) alleging fraud, deception, affairs, and dishonest business practices.
Karen created and ran a WordPress blog posting allegations sourced to third parties (notably Dr. Joseph Resnick); Karen circulated links via list-serves; Peggy messaged Cottrell’s Facebook contacts; the Crockers and Johnson also communicated disparaging material.
Cottrell sued for defamation, invasion of privacy (public disclosure of private facts), intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), tortious interference, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of the Georgia Computer Systems Protection Act (GCSPA).
At trial the jury returned verdicts favoring Cottrell on defamation (against Peggy and Karen), invasion of privacy (against all defendants), and breach of fiduciary duty (against Peggy and the Crockers), awarding general, punitive damages and fees; the jury found no special damages.
The superior court granted directed verdicts on IIED and GCSPA claims, and later granted JNOV (vacating the jury verdicts). Cottrell appealed; the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Validity of GCSPA claims (OCGA §16-9-93/.1)	Cottrell argued defendants’ online conduct satisfied various GCSPA offenses and gave rise to civil relief	Defendants argued the statutory elements (including specific criminal intent) were not met; superior court also questioned constitutionality of §16-9-93.1	Directed verdict for defendants affirmed: evidence failed to prove required statutory intent/elements, so GCSPA claims could not go to jury
IIED claim	Cottrell claimed defendants’ publications were extreme, outrageous, and caused severe distress	Defendants argued publications were not beyond all bounds of decency and distress was not severe	Directed verdict for defendants affirmed: conduct did not meet extreme/outrageous or severe distress standards
Defamation (libel/slander per se)	Cottrell argued posts/emails/Facebook messages were defamatory per se (no special damages required)	Defendants argued many statements were opinion, true, or lacked actual malice given Cottrell’s public-figure status and available sources	JNOV affirmed for defendants: insufficient evidence of actual malice (clear-and-convincing standard applies to Cottrell as limited-purpose public figure); many statements were opinion, supported by sources, or true
Invasion of privacy — public disclosure of private facts	Cottrell argued disclosures of affairs and running records were private embarrassing facts	Defendants argued the facts were not private (affairs were known/admitted; running controversies were public)	JNOV affirmed for defendants: disclosed facts were public or already revealed, so claim fails
Breach of fiduciary duty / aiding and abetting	Cottrell claimed Peggy and Crockers breached or procured breaches of fiduciary duties	Defendants argued no confidential/fiduciary relationship existed (paramour status insufficient); no evidence primary wrongdoers owed fiduciary duties	JNOV affirmed for defendants: plaintiff failed to prove existence of fiduciary/confidential relationship or required elements for procurement/aid

Key Cases Cited

Hood v. Smoak, 271 Ga. 86 (standard for directed verdict review) (Georgia Supreme Court)
ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (district court holding OCGA §16-9-93.1 unconstitutional as overbroad/vague, discussed below)
Bellemead, LLC v. Stoker, 280 Ga. 635 (defamation per se / when words are actionable as a matter of law)
Mathis v. Cannon, 276 Ga. 16 (limited-purpose public-figure analysis)
Atlanta Humane Soc. v. Mills, 274 Ga. App. 159 (actual malice / clear-and-convincing proof standard for public figures)
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Miller, 398 F.2d 218 (treatment of slander categories in libel context)