Cottrell v. Cottrell
2014 Ohio 646
Ohio Ct. App.2014Background
- Robert (Father) and Kathleen Cottrell (Mother) shared parenting of their son Alan (b. 1996) under an agreed shared-parenting plan after divorce proceedings; the plan began in mid-2011.
- By fall 2011 Alan (then 15–16) wanted to live only with Mother and repeatedly refused scheduled time with Father; Mother moved to modify the shared-parenting plan to sole custody in December 2011.
- A magistrate and the trial court found Alan sufficiently mature and concluded the shared plan was no longer in his best interest; Mother was made residential parent.
- Instead of imposing a specific set schedule, the magistrate ordered Father’s parenting time to follow Warren County’s Basic Parenting Schedule for ages 16–18 (the "16–18 Schedule"), which states parenting time "shall be fixed between the child and the non-residential parent" and "shall not be limited other than as the child and the non-residential parent choose," and ordered counseling.
- Father objected, raised a substantive due process challenge claiming the schedule let the minor effectively veto his visitation (and for the first time on second appeal claimed statutory noncompliance). The appellate court remanded solely on the constitutional issue; the trial court on remand upheld the 16–18 Schedule.
- This appeal challenges whether applying the 16–18 Schedule violated Father’s substantive due process right to parent; the court affirms, with a partial dissent concluding the schedule as applied was not narrowly tailored and effectively denied meaningful visitation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Father) | Defendant's Argument (Mother / Trial Court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether imposition of Warren County’s 16–18 Schedule violated Father’s substantive due process right to care, custody, and management of his child | The Schedule permits the minor to control visitation and, as applied (given Alan’s repeated refusals), effectively denies Father his fundamental parental right | The Schedule does not divest Father of rights; it defines scheduling authority between nonresidential parent and child (not the residential parent). Father retains remedies: court-ordered counseling, juvenile enforcement, or a motion for a definite schedule | Majority: No violation — strict scrutiny satisfied because the order (schedule + counseling) was narrowly tailored to serve compelling interest (child’s best interests). Dissent: violation — schedule as applied lets the child veto visitation and is not narrowly tailored |
| Whether the trial court complied with R.C. 3109.051(A) by providing a “specific schedule of parenting time” (statutory claim) | (Raised first time on this appeal) The 16–18 Schedule is not a specific parenting-time schedule as required | Trial court relied on termination of shared plan and application of county’s Basic Parenting Schedule as the specific schedule; appellate majority finds statutory claim forfeited but would reject it on the merits | Statutory claim not considered (forfeited); alternatively, majority finds compliance because the county schedule served as the specific schedule and Father could move to modify |
Key Cases Cited
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (U.S. 2000) (recognizes parental right to make decisions concerning care, custody, and control of children; substantive-due-process protection)
- Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (U.S. 1923) (parental liberty includes right to educate and raise children)
- Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (U.S. 1925) (parental liberty includes directing upbringing and education)
- Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (U.S. 1944) (custody, care, and nurture of a child reside first in the parents)
- Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (U.S. 1979) (family unit concept and parental authority over minor children)
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (U.S. 1982) (parental rights are fundamental and require heightened protection)
- Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (U.S. 1997) (substantive-due-process framework)
- Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (U.S. 1993) (substantive due process analysis)
- Braatz v. Braatz, 85 Ohio St.3d 40 (Ohio 1999) (trial court must make a just and reasonable visitation order unless visitation is not in child’s best interest)
- Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 82 Ohio St.3d 367 (Ohio 1998) (recognition of parental liberty interest under Ohio law)