Cottone v. Cottone CA4/3
G051676
| Cal. Ct. App. | Aug 26, 2016Background
- Brandi Cottone alleged her uncle Lee sexually molested her repeatedly between ages ~8–12 while she stayed overnight at Lee and his wife Jeanie’s home; Lee was later criminally convicted of lewd acts against a minor.
- Brandi sued Lee and Jeanie in civil court for assault, battery, negligence per se, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent supervision/failure to protect (Jeanie).
- Jeanie moved for summary judgment, submitting a declaration denying any knowledge of the molestation and stating she slept through the incidents; Brandi testified she never woke Jeanie or told her about the abuse at the time.
- Brandi submitted third‑party declarations describing Lee’s prior inappropriate sexual conduct toward adults and an alleged affair with a minor, but offered no direct evidence Jeanie knew or should have known Lee had molested children.
- The trial court granted Jeanie summary judgment, finding no triable issue that Jeanie had actual knowledge of Lee’s propensity to molest children and no basis for aiding‑and‑abetting liability; it sustained several evidentiary objections to speculative statements in opposing declarations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Jeanie can be held liable for negligence/failure to protect Brandi | Brandi: a reasonable juror could infer Jeanie, a light sleeper, must have seen/heard/felt the molestations over years and thus knew or should have known | Jeanie: no evidence she knew or suspected Lee molested children; Brandi testified Jeanie never woke and was unaware | Court: Affirmed summary judgment — no admissible evidence supporting actual knowledge or duty based on foreseeability |
| Whether Jeanie is liable for assault/battery or negligence per se via aiding and abetting Lee | Brandi: Jeanie’s alleged inaction and supervision failures amount to conscious participation or assistance | Jeanie: aiding and abetting requires conscious decision to participate in tortious conduct; no evidence of such intent or knowledge | Court: No triable issue of aiding and abetting; summary judgment proper |
| Whether evidence of Lee’s prior sexual misconduct toward adults or his early marriage supports inference Jeanie knew of child‑molesting propensity | Brandi: incidents of groping adults, early marriage/age facts permit inference Jeanie knew or should have known of deviant propensities | Jeanie: adult‑directed misconduct and marriage timing do not show knowledge of child‑molesting history or convictions | Court: Such evidence insufficient to infer Jeanie knew Lee was likely to molest a child; Pamela L. distinguished; summary judgment affirmed |
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining or overruling evidentiary objections on summary judgment | Brandi: court improperly sustained objections and failed to strike parts of Jeanie’s declaration | Jeanie: many opposing statements were speculative, conclusory, hearsay, or lacked personal knowledge | Court: No abuse of discretion — the court properly excluded speculative/opinion statements and hearsay while leaving factual bases intact |
Key Cases Cited
- Chaney v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. App. 4th 152 (1995) (actual knowledge of spouse’s propensities may be inferred only where evidence compels a non‑speculative inference)
- Pamela L. v. Farmer, 112 Cal. App. 3d 206 (1980) (wife may be liable where she knew husband was sexual offender and nonetheless exposed children to him)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 25 Cal. 4th 826 (2001) (summary judgment burden‑shifting framework)
- Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317 (2000) (standard for reviewing admissible evidence on summary judgment)