Costanich v. DEPT. OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES
627 F.3d 1101
| 9th Cir. | 2010Background
- Costanich was a long-time foster parent whose license was revoked by DSHS after an investigation by CPS social worker Duron alleging emotional abuse.
- An administrative law judge reversed the license revocation, but the Washington Court of Appeals later upheld the ALJ’s determination.
- Costanich asserted §1983 claims against Duron and other DSHS officials for due process deprivations related to the license and guardianship of E. and B.
- The district court granted summary judgment in favor of DSHS on absolute immunity for license revocation and on qualified immunity for other claims.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding Duron was not absolutely immune for the investigation or declaration, but qualified immunity applied in part, and that most officials were immune for various actions including the revocation.
- Key factual issues included whether Duron deliberately fabricated evidence and whether such fabrication violated a due process right that was clearly established at the time.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Duron and others were absolutely immune for license revocation. | Costanich argues against absolute immunity for the revocation acts. | DSHS officials contend license revocation is a discretionary, quasi-prosecutorial act deserving absolute immunity. | Yes, for Duron, McKenny, and Bulzomi, absolute immunity for license revocation. |
| Whether Duron is absolutely immune for investigation and declaration supporting guardianship termination. | Duron’s fabrication of evidence and sworn declaration violate due process. | Beltran controls; such investigative acts are not absolutely immune. | No absolute immunity for Duron for investigation and declaration. |
| Whether Duron is entitled to qualified immunity for the investigation and declaration. | Duron violated clearly established due process rights by fabricating evidence. | Right was not clearly established at the time in civil foster-care proceedings. | Duron entitled to qualified immunity for 2001–2002 conduct; right not clearly established then. |
| Whether the right not to be subjected to deliberately fabricated evidence in civil child abuse proceedings was clearly established in 2001. | The right exists under Devereaux and Pyle analogies. | Right not clearly established in civil context at that time. | Not clearly established in 2001; affirmed qualified-immunity ruling on that basis. |
Key Cases Cited
- Beltran v. Santa Clara County, 514 F.3d 906 (en banc, 9th Cir. 2008) (absolute immunity for initiating dependency proceedings; no absolute immunity for fabrication)
- Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1987) (social workers’ absolute immunity for initiating proceedings)
- Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003) (functionality of immunity depends on specific function performed)
- Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070 (en banc, 9th Cir. 2001) (deliberate fabrication of evidence not protected by qualified immunity; right clearly established in some contexts)
- Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) (fabrication of evidence and sworn statements during investigations may negate immunity)
- Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997) (touchstone: immunity depends on the function performed, not title)
- Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942) (prosecution’s use of perjured testimony violates due process; foundational analogies for later civil contexts)
- Jones v. State, 242 P.3d 825 (Was. 2010) (statutory rights to licenses; discussed due process and property interests in licenses)