Cortese v. Terrace of St. Cloud, LLC
6:15-cv-02009
M.D. Fla.Apr 22, 2016Background
- Plaintiff Mary Ellen Cortese, an LPN, worked for Southern Oaks beginning June 2010; Terrace of St. Cloud, LLC purchased Southern Oaks in November 2013 and formally took over December 1, 2013.
- Cortese used intermittent FMLA leave for her own degenerative foot disease and to care for her husband with cancer in 2012.
- Southern Oaks supervisor issued a negative performance evaluation referencing attendance/family illness and threatened termination for continued FMLA leave.
- During Terrace’s pre-acquisition interview, Cortese disclosed her prior FMLA leave; Terrace terminated her on the day it took over Southern Oaks.
- Cortese sued under the FMLA alleging (Count I) retaliation and (Count II) interference; Terrace moved to dismiss both counts for failure to state a claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Count II (interference) is duplicative and subject to dismissal | Cortese pleads a valid interference claim based on prior supervisory actions and threats | Terrace says the interference claim merely duplicates the retaliation claim and should be dismissed | Court: Denied — redundancy is not a grounds for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) if claim is valid |
| Whether Count I (retaliation) alleges sufficient facts to state a claim | Cortese alleges FMLA-protected leave, prior threats/evaluation, Terrace learned of leave at interview, and termination the same day | Terrace argues Cortese failed to plead causation/ prima facie retaliation facts | Court: Denied — pleading standard satisfied; reasonable inference of retaliation based on temporal proximity and prior treatment |
| Whether Terrace can be held liable as successor-in-interest for Southern Oaks’ conduct | Cortese alleges Terrace acquired Southern Oaks, interviewed her, knew of prior FMLA issues, and then terminated her | Terrace contends Cortese failed to plead the §825.107(a) successor-in-interest factors | Court: Denied — at pleading stage notice of theory and facts is sufficient; later proof of successor status addressed on the merits |
| Whether plaintiff needed to plead a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case | Cortese relies on factual allegations to permit inference of discrimination | Terrace asserts plaintiff must plead prima facie elements at the pleading stage | Court: Denied — reiterated Swierkiewicz that a prima facie case need not be pled; only plausible facts supporting an inference of discrimination are required |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (pleading must be plausible on its face)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (court need not accept legal conclusions; evaluate plausibility)
- Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (plaintiff need not plead prima facie case to survive motion to dismiss)
- Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332 (11th Cir.) (accept well-pleaded complaint allegations as true on motion to dismiss)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (prima facie framework for proving discrimination)