Corsello v. Verizon New York, Inc., 18 N.Y.3d 777

Verizon attached a terminal box to plaintiffs' Brooklyn building, enabling service to multiple buildings and using plaintiffs' property without compensation.
Plaintiffs allege a de facto taking under Transportation Corporations Law § 27 and seek just compensation, injunctive relief, and damages on four theories: inverse condemnation, unjust enrichment, trespass, and GBL § 349 deception.
Supreme Court dismissed unjust enrichment but upheld inverse condemnation, trespass, and GBL § 349; later, the Appellate Division modified, reinstating inverse condemnation while dismissing other claims and denying class certification.
Appellate Division held inverse condemnation time-barred by CPLR 214(4) but allowed Real Property Law § 261 to save the claim; it affirmed dismissal of the GBL § 349 and unjust enrichment claims and affirmed denial of class certification.
Court of Appeals (this opinion) reinstates the inverse condemnation claim, but dismisses the GBL § 349 and unjust enrichment claims and affirms denial of class certification.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether inverse condemnation lies for de facto taking	Corsello argues de facto taking via attachment is recoverable under §27.	Verizon contends only trespass or permanent injury; inverse condemnation not available absent formal eminent-domain exercise.	Inverse condemnation claim valid; de facto taking may be recovered.
Whether Real Property Law § 261 tolls or saves the inverse condemnation claim	Section 261 saves timeliness regardless of modern methods.	Section 261 does not apply to de facto takings not involving adverse possession or prescriptive rights.	Section 261 applies; claim timely.
Whether General Business Law § 349 claim is time-barred	GBL § 349 claim should be timely under discovery rule after deception.	Three-year statute runs from deception or injury; estoppel not supported.	GBL § 349 claim time-barred.
Whether unjust enrichment claim survives	Unjust enrichment補ounds from defendant's wrongful taking/deception.	Duplicative of tort claims; not an independent basis when others fail.	Unjust enrichment claim dismissed.
Whether to certify a class action	Case suitable for class treatment; common questions predominate.	Class treatment inappropriate due to case-specific evidence and lack of predominance.	denial of class certification affirmed.

Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (modern inverse condemnation covers de facto takings without formal eminent domain)
Pappenheim v Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., 128 N.Y.436 (1891) (equitable relief for continuance of trespass may determine damages and convey right upon payment)
Ferguson v Village of Hamburg, 272 N.Y. 234 (1936) (early use of inverse condemnation concept for taking by eminent domain power)
United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253 (1980) (inverse condemnation defined as recovery of just compensation for de facto takings)
Tuffley v City of Syracuse, 82 A.D.2d 110 (1981) (inverse condemnation as remedy for continuous, permanent occupation cloaked with eminent domain power)
General Stencils v. Chiappa, 18 N.Y.2d 125 (1966) (equitable estoppel in limitations cases requires concealment of wrongdoing with later misrepresentation)
Simcuski v. Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d 442 (1978) (estoppel requires concealment that misleads plaintiff about wrongdoing)
Gaidon v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 96 N.Y.2d 201 (2001) (statute of limitations runs from injury, not deception; discovery rule not applicable here)
Lombardi, Inc. v. Smithfield, 11 A.3d 1180 (Del. 1989) (irreparable harm is the most important factor for a preliminary injunction)