Corrine Augustine Nichols Hill Shearer v. David Shearer, Individually and as Independent Administrator of the Estate of John William Shearer, III
12-14-00302-CV
| Tex. App. | Mar 9, 2015Background
- Decedent John Shearer was married (ceremonially) to Corrine Shearer until a 2008 divorce; they continued living together; John was hospitalized Nov–Dec 2009 and died Dec 9, 2009.
- David Shearer, John’s adult son, claimed he was reasonably available and had authority to make medical decisions, but visited in-person only once while John was hospitalized; Corrine communicated with and made many treatment decisions for John, including consenting to surgeries.
- Corrine authorized entry of a Do-Not-Resuscitate (DNR) order for John; she did not tell David that she had entered the DNR.
- David sued Corrine individually and as independent administrator of John’s estate for multiple claims: invasion of privacy under Health & Safety Code §166.039(b), breach of fiduciary duty (individual), conversion of ashes, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); he sought mental-anguish and exemplary damages.
- At trial the jury found for David on breach of fiduciary duty and IIED, awarding mental-anguish and exemplary damages; Corrine moved for directed verdicts and post-trial JNOV motions challenging (1) existence of an informal fiduciary duty and (2) survival of the IIED claim given alternative remedies; the trial court denied Corrine’s motions and she appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Corrine owed David an informal (confidential) fiduciary duty | David: he trusted and relied on Corrine during John’s hospitalization; she communicated with him daily and thus owed him a duty to inform and act in his interest | Corrine: relationship had deteriorated since 2003; any trust was subjective and unjustified; no prior confidential relationship existed apart from the events at issue | Appellant argues no legally or factually sufficient evidence of an informal fiduciary duty; trial court denied directed verdict and jury found a duty (issue on appeal) |
| Whether David was accustomed to being guided by Corrine or justified in believing she would act for his benefit | David: phone contact and information flow during hospitalization established reliance and expectation Corrine would act for his interests | Corrine: evidence shows estrangement, limited interaction, and that she acted solely for John’s best interest; David had actual opportunity and authority but did not assert it | Appellant contends evidence of reliance was legally/factually insufficient; jury disagreed at trial (being reviewed on appeal) |
| Whether relative positions showed dominance/dependence supporting confidential relationship | David: family ties, personal hardships, and limited presence at hospital created dependence | Corrine: David was aware of his rights and reasonably able to assert them by phone; no dominance or incapacity shown | Appellant argues the weight of evidence disproves inequality required for fiduciary duty |
| Whether IIED claim should have been submitted when alternative statutory/common-law remedies existed | David: IIED was pleaded as a remedy for severe emotional distress caused by Corrine’s conduct (and invasion-of-privacy claims were also pleaded) | Corrine: IIED is a gap-filler tort; where other adequate causes (e.g., invasion of privacy under §166.039(b) or statutory rights over disposition) can provide mental-anguish recovery, IIED should be barred | Appellant argues IIED should have been excluded because alternative remedies were available and submitted to jury; trial court allowed IIED and jury awarded IIED damages (appeal challenges survival) |
Key Cases Cited
- Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. 1962) (establishes informal/confidential fiduciary relationship principles)
- Meyer v. Cathey, 167 S.W.3d 327 (Tex. 2005) (confidential relationship must exist prior to and apart from disputed transaction)
- Vanderpool v. Vanderpool, 442 S.W.3d 756 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2014) (reluctance to expand fiduciary duties; family tie alone insufficient)
- Pope v. Darcey, 667 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984) (confidential relationship when parties do not deal equally due to dominance or dependence)
- Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2005) (IIED is a gap-filler; barred if alternative adequate remedy exists)
- Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438 (Tex. 2004) (IIED only when no other recognized means of redress)
- Standard Fruit & Veg. Co. v. Johnson, 985 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. 1998) (principle limiting IIED where other torts provide remedy)
- Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. 1995) (standard for reviewing legal sufficiency/more-than-a-scintilla evidence)