Coroles v. State, 2015 UT 48

Thomas Coroles died after treatment for flu-like symptoms; his wife Michelle filed a medical-malpractice claim and completed the Malpractice Act prelitigation panel process required by Utah law.
Proceedings before the prelitigation panel are statutorily "confidential, privileged, and immune from civil process." Counsel for Michelle disclosed alleged panel opinions in letters to two prospective retained medical experts.
Michelle timely designated those two experts (and served their reports) on the scheduling-order deadline; defendants moved to strike them as tainted by disclosure of confidential panel information and moved for summary judgment.
Michelle then served supplemental expert designations two weeks after defendants’ motion to strike; defendants moved to exclude the supplemental experts as untimely under the scheduling order.
The district court excluded the original experts (as per se tainted) and also excluded the supplemental experts (applying Utah R. Civ. P. 37(h)), then granted summary judgment for defendants. Michelle appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether experts who were exposed to confidential prelitigation-panel information must be per se excluded	Coroles: exposure alone should not create an irrebuttable presumption of taint; court must determine whether experts actually relied on confidential information and if they can form opinions without it	Defendants: disclosure of panel opinions violates the Malpractice Act confidentiality; appropriate remedy is exclusion of those experts	Court reversed: per se exclusion was error; court must inquire whether experts relied on confidential material and may allow testimony if experts can render opinions without using it (with remedies like striking references or in camera inquiry)
Whether supplemental experts designated after the scheduling-order deadline may be excluded under rule 37(h) as a mandatory sanction	Coroles: late designations should be evaluated under Rule 16(d) (district court discretion to choose sanction); exclusion is extreme and not warranted here given prompt replacement and little prejudice	Defendants: late disclosure prejudiced them and Rule 37(h) requires exclusion unless nondisclosing party shows harmlessness or good cause	Court reversed exclusion: district court applied wrong rule (37(h)); Rule 16(d) governs sanctions for missed scheduling-order deadlines and exclusion is an extreme sanction that was an abuse of discretion on these facts

Robertson v. Union Pac. R.R. , 954 F.2d 1433 (8th Cir. 1992) (interpreting highway-safety-report nonadmissibility and its effect on experts)
United States v. Egan Marine Corp. , 808 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (refusing automatic disqualification of experts who reviewed inadmissible marine casualty reports)
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc. , 840 F. Supp. 2d 1072 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (ordering an expert to compartmentalize confidential material rather than disqualifying him)
Lanasa v. Harrison , 828 So. 2d 602 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (permitting expert testimony despite prior review of inadmissible highway-safety report when opinion was independently formed)
Spratley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 78 P.3d 603 (Utah 2003) (describing protective tools—sealing, protective orders, in camera proceedings—for safeguarding confidential information)
Boice ex rel. Boice v. Marble , 982 P.2d 565 (Utah 1999) (holding exclusion of a replacement expert was an abuse of discretion where plaintiff timely sought substitution under circumstances beyond his control)
Geiserman v. MacDonald , 893 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1990) (federal precedent treating Rule 16 analog for sanctions involving untimely expert designation)