Cornwell, Robert William, 2015 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1055

Background

Robert Cornwell called Montgomery County probation staff and Assistant DA Kourtney Teaff, falsely identifying himself as a Dallas County assistant district attorney to seek lenient treatment for a friend with a probation-revocation capias.
Cornwell was not an attorney; he used his real name, asked for personal contact (not official channels), and framed his request as a "personal favor" from a member of the "same team."
During calls/emails he claimed prior prosecutorial acts (e.g., running criminal histories, reviewing files, prosecuting a relative), which Teaff recorded and retained.
Indicted under Tex. Penal Code § 37.11(a)(1) for impersonating a public servant with intent to induce Teaff to submit to his pretended authority or rely on his pretended official acts; jury convicted and sentenced to two years.
Cornwell conceded impersonation but argued insufficiency of evidence as to the requisite specific intent, particularly under the "reliance" theory: he said he only sought a personal favor, not to induce reliance on any pretended official act.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, holding Cornwell’s statements recounting fabricated prosecutorial acts were pretended official acts (speech counts as an "act") and supported a finding he intended Teaff to rely on them.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Cornwell)	Held
Whether §37.11(a)(1) requires proof of an act in addition to false identification under the reliance theory	The statute requires only impersonation plus specific intent to induce reliance; Cornwell’s false recounting of prosecutorial acts and his impersonation suffice to show intent to induce reliance	Cornwell: The State must prove a separate "pretended official act" beyond mere impersonation; he only asked for a personal favor, not an official act	Held: No separate elemental "act as such" is required; speech claiming prior official acts can constitute "pretended official acts" supporting intent to induce reliance
Whether Cornwell’s requests framed as a "personal favor" defeat reliance theory	The State: Context shows Cornwell intended Teaff to rely on his purported status and recited acts when deciding the favor	Cornwell: Because he sought a personal favor and did not assert official authority, he lacked intent to induce reliance on any pretended official act	Held: Jury could infer Cornwell intended his false status and statements to make Teaff more likely to grant the favor; reliance theory satisfied
Whether prior case law (Boyett) requires an overt act element for current §37.11	The State: Boyett addressed a differently worded predecessor statute and does not control the current statute	Cornwell: Boyett and cases following it require proving an "act" beyond impersonation	Held: Boyett interpreted different statutory language; current §37.11 does not import an "act as such" element, though proving intent will often rely on evidence of pretended acts
Whether ambiguous phrase in indictment ("by trying to resolve a pending criminal case") created a material variance	The State: Phrase was descriptive of motive/non-elemental facts and surplusage	Cornwell: Phrase identified the pretended official act and thus had to be proven as alleged	Held: Phrase is immaterial surplusage and not part of the hypothetically correct jury charge; no fatal variance

Key Cases Cited

Boyett v. State, 368 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963) (construed predecessor statute to require acting "as such")
Ex parte Niswanger, 335 S.W.3d 611 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (discussed meaning of "pretended official acts" but relied on Boyett)
Cornwell v. State, 445 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014) (court of appeals affirmed sufficiency under reliance theory)
Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (surplusage/variance principles and hypothetically correct jury charge)
Johnson v. State, 364 S.W.3d 292 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (clarified when descriptive averments create material variance)