Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors Revisions: 7/09/24, 603 U.S. 799

Background

The Durbin Amendment (Dodd‑Frank) directed the Federal Reserve Board to set standards ensuring debit‑card interchange fees are “reasonable and proportional”; the Board promulgated Regulation II in 2011, capping fees.
Corner Post opened in 2018, paid interchange fees, and in 2021 joined an APA suit alleging Regulation II exceeds statutory authority.
The District Court dismissed the challenge as time‑barred by 28 U.S.C. §2401(a)’s six‑year limit; the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding facial APA challenges accrue at promulgation.
Circuits were split: several had treated facial challenges as accruing at final agency action; at least one had applied a plaintiff‑injury accrual rule for as‑applied claims.
The Supreme Court granted review to resolve when an APA claim “accrues” under §2401(a).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When does an APA claim “accrue” under 28 U.S.C. §2401(a)?	Accrual occurs when the plaintiff is injured by final agency action (plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action).	Accrual occurs when agency action is final (e.g., rule promulgation); limitations run from finality even if some plaintiffs are not yet injured.	Accrues when the plaintiff is injured by final agency action — the statute runs from the moment the particular plaintiff has a complete cause of action.
Is §2401(a) a statute of limitations (plaintiff‑centric) or a statute of repose (defendant‑centric)?	§2401(a) is a statute of limitations tied to accrual when the plaintiff can sue.	§2401(a) should be read like repose for agency suits, measured from final agency action.	§2401(a) is a limitations provision using traditional accrual language; it does not operate as a general statute of repose keyed to finality.
Do other administrative statutes that start deadlines at finality control §2401(a)’s meaning?	Those statutes are textually distinct (they reference promulgation/entry) and thus do not displace §2401(a)’s ordinary accrual rule.	The widespread practice of finality‑based deadlines shows Congress intended finality to govern accrual for agency suits.	Textual differences matter; Congress knows how to adopt a finality rule and did so elsewhere, so §2401(a) must be read according to its own text.
Is vacatur an available remedy under the APA (relevance to unregulated plaintiffs)?	Vacatur is authorized by §706(2)’s command to “set aside” agency action and is necessary to afford relief to unregulated but affected parties.	The Government has argued “set aside” might not permit vacatur and instead limits relief to injunctions against enforcement.	The Court assumed vacatur without deciding; Justice Kavanaugh (concurring) explained and endorsed that the APA authorizes vacatur and that vacatur is necessary for unregulated plaintiffs to obtain meaningful relief.

Key Cases Cited

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (presumption favoring judicial review of agency action)
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (defines "final agency action" for §704 purposes)
Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547 (2016) (accrual occurs when plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action)
Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442 (2013) (accrual and limitations principles; "complete and present" cause of action language)
Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp., 522 U.S. 192 (1997) (limitations periods begin when plaintiff can file and obtain relief)
CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1 (2014) (distinction between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose)
Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 386 U.S. 503 (1967) (interpreting §2401(a) and accrual in administrative/contract contexts)
Reading Co. v. Koons, 271 U.S. 58 (1926) (accrual can turn on rights of real parties in interest; context matters)
Rotkiske v. Klemm, 589 U.S. 8 (2019) (do not read into a limitations statute language Congress knows how to adopt elsewhere)
Niz‑Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155 (2021) (text controls; administrative convenience cannot override clear statutory text)