Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 603 U.S. 799

Background:

The Durbin Amendment (Dodd‑Frank) required the Federal Reserve to ensure debit-card interchange fees are "reasonable and proportional," and the Board promulgated Regulation II in 2011 capping interchange fees.
Corner Post (a merchant founded 2017, opened 2018) paid interchange fees and in 2021 joined an APA challenge alleging Regulation II exceeds statutory limits.
The district court dismissed as time‑barred under 28 U.S.C. §2401(a)’s six‑year limit; the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding facial APA challenges accrue at promulgation/publication.
Circuits were split: multiple circuits treated facial challenges as accruing at final agency action; at least one (Sixth) treated accrual as plaintiff‑specific (when injured).
The Supreme Court reversed: it held §2401(a) accrual for APA claims occurs when the plaintiff is injured by final agency action, not merely when the rule was promulgated.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When does an APA claim "accrue" under 28 U.S.C. §2401(a)?	Accrual is plaintiff‑specific: accrues when the plaintiff is injured by final agency action.	Accrual occurs when agency action becomes final (promulgation); statute runs from that date.	Accrues when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action—i.e., is injured by final agency action.
Is §2401(a) a statute of limitations (plaintiff‑centric) or a statute of repose (defendant‑centric)?	§2401(a) uses traditional accrual language and is a statute of limitations tied to plaintiff's right to sue.	It should be read like repose for agency suits to provide finality measured from agency action.	Text, history, and precedent show §2401(a) is an accrual‑based statute of limitations, not a general statute of repose.
Do other statutes that start time limits at finality (Hobbs Act, etc.) demonstrate a background rule displacing §2401(a)’s ordinary meaning?	Those specific statutes use different text; Congress knows how to tie deadlines to finality but did not do so in §2401(a).	Many statutes adopt finality‑based clocks, showing administrative‑law practice supports starting the clock at finality.	Specific finality statutes do not displace §2401(a); their different wording shows Congress knew how to require finality but chose different language in §2401(a).
Should policy concerns (administrative finality, reliance) alter accrual?	Plaintiff: preserving judicial review and plaintiff access outweighs administrative convenience.	Defendant: permitting late facial challenges undermines finality, reliance, and agency administration.	Policy concerns cannot override clear statutory text; the plaintiff‑centric accrual rule better protects judicial review and individual rights.

Key Cases Cited

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (presumption of judicial review under the APA; injury requirement for plaintiffs)
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (defining "final agency action" for §704 reviewability)
Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192 (1997) (limitations accrue when plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief)
Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442 (2013) (definition of when a right "accrues")
Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547 (2016) (accrual when plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action)
CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1 (2014) (distinguishing statutes of limitations from statutes of repose)
Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 386 U.S. 503 (1967) (accrual is context dependent; §2401(a) accrual tied to right to sue)
Reading Co. v. Koons, 271 U.S. 58 (1926) (accrual analysis in the wrongful‑death/beneficiary context)
TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001) (limitations begin when plaintiff has the right to apply to a court)
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) (discussion of accrual phrasing and injury‑based commencement)