Cornell Restaurant Ventures, LLC v. The City of Oakland Park, 681 F. App'x 859

Background

In 1977 Oakland Park adopted zoning that barred adult-entertainment clubs within 1,000 feet of schools/churches but grandfathered preexisting nonconforming uses; Playpen (later Pure Platinum) remained under the grandfather clause.
In 1987 a federal court permanently enjoined enforcement of the 1977 zoning provision against the Pure Platinum property based on the grandfather clause.
In 2004 the City amended zoning and enacted new licensing rules for sexually oriented businesses: licensing banned full nudity, employee-patron contact, and sale/consumption of alcohol; the licensing ordinance had no grandfather clause but gave existing businesses 180 days to comply.
Plaintiffs (owners/operators of Pure Platinum and Solid Gold) settled earlier suits with the City for 11-year exemptions; Pure Platinum’s settlement required eventual compliance with licensing rules, Solid Gold’s settlement required ceasing adult operations after 11 years.
As the 11-year period expired, the City sought enforcement; the district court enjoined certain zoning enforcement for Solid Gold but denied an injunction against enforcing the licensing regulations; the district court later granted partial summary judgment for the City on the licensing regulations.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether enforcing the 2004 licensing regulations against Pure Platinum violates the 1987 injunction	The 1987 injunction protected Pure Platinum’s right to non-obscene nude dancing and alcohol, so licensing bans on full nudity and alcohol nullify the injunction	The 1987 injunction only barred enforcement of the 1977 zoning provision against that specific property (grandfather protection); it did not address operational licensing rules	1987 injunction did not bar enforcement of the licensing regulations; injunction concerned zoning only and does not cover licensing rules
Whether the licensing regulations violate the First Amendment by not being reasonably designed to further a substantial government interest	Owners presented local evidence (crime analysis, consultant affidavit, owner affidavits) to show no negative secondary effects and to cast direct doubt on the City’s evidence	City relied on legislative findings and a body of studies and judicial opinions demonstrating that sexually oriented businesses produce negative secondary effects; burden-shifting requires plaintiffs to cast direct doubt on that record	Licensing regulations are reasonably designed to serve the substantial government interest in reducing secondary effects; plaintiffs failed to cast direct doubt on the City’s evidence
Whether the City’s reliance on out-of-jurisdiction studies and prior settlements undermines its secondary-effects rationale	Settlement pause and use of outside studies show lack of genuine legislative belief in harms	Government may reasonably rely on judicial opinions and studies from other jurisdictions; settlements do not negate legislative purpose	City satisfied initial burden with reasonably relevant evidence; settlements and use of outside studies do not defeat constitutionality
Whether precedent required different treatment of the evidence or created an inconsistent standard	Owners argued Eleventh Circuit precedent is inconsistent in weighing secondary-effects evidence	Court applied controlling Eleventh Circuit framework (Peek-A-Boo I/II) and emphasized fact-specific record-driven inquiry	Court properly followed precedent (Peek-A-Boo II) and found the record similar enough to sustain the ordinance

Key Cases Cited

Peek-A-Boo Lounge of Bradenton, Inc. v. Manatee Cty., 630 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2011) (framework for evaluating secondary-effects evidence and burden-shifting)
Peek-A-Boo Lounge of Bradenton, Inc. v. Manatee Cty., 337 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2003) (distinguishing Renton and O’Brien analyses for zoning vs. nudity regulations)
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (time, place, manner standard for zoning ordinances regulating secondary effects)
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (four-part test for regulation of expressive conduct)
City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002) (Supreme Court guidance on secondary-effects evidence; Kennedy concurrence treated as controlling)
City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (application of O’Brien test to public-nudity regulation)
Daytona Grand, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach, 490 F.3d 860 (11th Cir. 2007) (discussing evidentiary limits of relying on calls for police service)
Artistic Entertainment, Inc. v. City of Warner Robins, 223 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2000) (courts reluctant to probe alleged illicit legislative motive)
Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2005) (conclusory affidavits insufficient to create material factual disputes)
Krueger v. City of Pensacola, 759 F.2d 851 (11th Cir. 1985) (judicial caution in inferring legislative motive)