Cornelis P. Willig v. Marcela Gutierrez Diaz
01-15-00073-CV
| Tex. App. | Jul 6, 2015Background
- Willig (appellant) filed an original petition for divorce in Harris County, Texas on March 24, 2014, seeking an in rem/status divorce (no property division).
- Diaz (appellee) filed a February 2014 submission in the Netherlands requesting temporary maintenance only; her actual Netherlands divorce petition was filed March 28, 2014.
- Diaz special-appeared and moved to abate/dismiss the Texas action on comity/first-filed grounds; the Texas trial court granted the special appearance and dismissed the Texas case in October 2014.
- Willig testified (uncontradicted) that he established Texas domicile/residence in January–March 2010 and satisfied Tex. Fam. Code § 6.301 residency requirements before filing.
- The Dutch court later abated its proceedings (Dec. 24, 2014), acknowledging Willig’s Harris County filing preceded Diaz’s Netherlands divorce petition and deferring to Harris County; the Texas appeal was abated and then reinstated after trial-court findings were entered.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Willig) | Defendant's Argument (Diaz) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the trial court err by granting Diaz’s special appearance and dismissing Willig’s Texas divorce because the Netherlands court had assumed jurisdiction? | Willig: Texas divorce filed first (Mar. 24, 2014); Netherlands filing for divorce occurred later (Mar. 28, 2014); dismissal based on Dutch jurisdiction is factually wrong. | Diaz: Comity/first-filed principles support deferring to Dutch court; Netherlands had assumed jurisdiction. | Trial court dismissed; Willig argues error because Texas filing was first and Dutch court later abated proceedings in favor of Harris County. |
| Was Willig entitled to an in rem/status divorce under Tex. Fam. Code §§ 6.301 & 6.308 despite lack of personal jurisdiction over Diaz? | Willig: He met domicile/residency requirements of § 6.301 and sought only a status divorce permitted by § 6.308 (no property division). | Diaz: Argued jurisdictional defects and urged dismissal/abatement. | Controlling Texas precedent allows courts to grant a divorce (status) even if they lack personal jurisdiction to divide property; Willig asserts he met requirements and should have been granted divorce. |
| Were the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law supported by the evidence? | Willig: No — findings contradict his uncontroverted testimony and documentary evidence showing Texas domicile/residency since 2010 and chronology of filings. | Diaz: Relied on filings and affidavit supporting the special appearance. | Willig contends several trial-court factual findings are unsupported and contrary to the record; he asserts legal error follows. |
| Should the appellate court render judgment granting the divorce or remand? | Willig: Render the in rem divorce under § 6.308 or remand with directions to enter the divorce. | Diaz: Sought dismissal in Texas and preservation of Netherlands proceedings. | Willig asks for rendition or remand; outcome depends on appellate treatment of jurisdiction, comity, and factual findings. |
Key Cases Cited
- Dawson-Austin v. Austin, 968 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. 1998) (a court may grant a divorce though it lacks personal jurisdiction to divide property)
- Mason v. Mason, 321 S.W.3d 178 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010) (explains severability of divorce decree and property-division jurisdiction)
- Griffith v. Griffith, 341 S.W.3d 43 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011) (discusses comity vs. dominant-jurisdiction/first-filed principles between states)
- In re AutoNation, Inc., 228 S.W.3d 663 (Tex. 2007) (describes comity as discretionary and not obligatory)
- Stallworth v. Stallworth, 201 S.W.3d 338 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006) (addresses subject-matter jurisdiction and consideration of jurisdictional facts in family cases)