Cornelio Sales Jr. v. Jefferson Sessions
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 15659
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Cornelio Dela Cruz Sales, Jr., a Filipino national and U.S. lawful permanent resident, was convicted in California (1995) of second-degree murder on an aiding-and-abetting theory and served 19 years.
- At trial the jury was instructed that Sales could be convicted if he intended to aid one or more nonmurder "target" offenses and murder was a natural and probable consequence of that target offense.
- The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction; Sales was later placed in removal proceedings as an aggravated felon under 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
- Sales argued before the BIA and this Court that California’s natural-and-probable-consequences aiding-and-abetting doctrine could reach conduct outside the generic federal definition of murder accomplice liability, so his conviction should not match the federal aggravated-felony definition.
- The BIA relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Duenas-Alvarez to find California law not "special," and concluded the conviction matched generic murder; the Ninth Circuit agreed and denied the petition for review.
Issues
| Issue | Sales' Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an aiding-and-abetting conviction under California’s natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine can be broader than the generic federal accomplice definition such that it is not an aggravated felony | California law (per Sales and Cruz-Santos) can convict for murder based on nonviolent target offenses, producing a realistic probability of non-generic application | California’s doctrine aligns with the generic federal definition described in Duenas-Alvarez; Sales’ facts show foreseeability of violence | Held for government: California law is not shown to be applied in a special, nongeneric way; conviction is an aggravated felony |
| Whether more recent federal law (Rosemond) narrowed generic accomplice liability such that Sales’ conviction falls outside the federal definition | Rosemond requires greater specific knowledge and thus could narrow aiding-and-abetting liability | Rosemond did not address natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine and does not change Duenas-Alvarez’s framework; Sales’ conduct showed full knowledge | Held for government: Rosemond does not alter the applicable generic definition and does not help Sales |
Key Cases Cited
- Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007) (holding California aiding-and-abetting convictions match generic federal definitions absent a showing of a realistic probability of nongeneric application)
- Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014) (requires proof that aider/abettor knew the salient facts of the crime for certain federal accomplice statutes; did not resolve natural-and-probable-consequences scope)
- People v. Chiu, 325 P.3d 972 (Cal. 2014) (California Supreme Court reaffirmed that natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine can support aider-and-abettor liability for second-degree murder but not for first-degree murder due to premeditation)