Corinth Pellets, LLC v. Arch Specialty Insurance Co., 246 A.3d 586

Corinth Pellets owned a wood-pellet mill insured under a surplus‑lines policy issued by Arch Specialty; the policy ran initially Jan 13, 2017–Jan 13, 2018 and was extended through September 18, 2018.
A Varney agent (Corinth’s broker) told Corinth in mid‑September 2018 that Arch would not renew; Arch never gave written notice of nonrenewal to Corinth or Varney.
On September 19, 2018 (the day after the policy expired), the mill suffered a catastrophic fire causing ~ $15 million in damage; Arch denied coverage on the ground the policy had expired on September 18.
Corinth sued, alleging Arch violated 24‑A M.R.S. § 2009‑A (surplus‑lines notice requirement) and breached the policy; the trial court dismissed under M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), construing § 2009‑A to require notice only when an insurer both cancels and does not renew.
The Business & Consumer Docket certified partial final judgment under M.R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1); the Maine Supreme Judicial Court accepted review, vacated the dismissal, and remanded.
The Supreme Judicial Court held § 2009‑A requires at least 14 days’ written notice before either cancellation or nonrenewal of surplus‑lines coverage, but left Arch’s constitutional vagueness challenge for the trial court to consider.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether 24‑A M.R.S. § 2009‑A requires written notice before nonrenewal of a surplus‑lines policy	§ 2009‑A’s notice requirement covers nonrenewal; Arch’s failure to give written nonrenewal notice means the policy automatically renewed	The statute’s phrase “cancellation and nonrenewal” means notice is required only when an insurer cancels a policy and does not renew it (i.e., § applies only to cancellations)	The statute is ambiguous on its face but, considering insurance definitions, legislative history, and agency practice, § 2009‑A requires 14 days’ written notice before either cancellation or nonrenewal; dismissal vacated and remanded
Whether interlocutory appeal was properly certified under M.R. Civ. P. 54(b)	(Corinth/Varney) Immediate appellate review appropriate because the statutory question is narrow and dispositive	(Arch) —	Trial court’s Rule 54(b)(1) certification was supported by specific findings and not an abuse of discretion; appellate review permitted

Dickau v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., 107 A.3d 621 (Me. 2014) (rejects statutory interpretations that render language surplusage)
McClare v. Rocha, 86 A.3d 22 (Me. 2014) (factors to consider for M.R. Civ. P. 54(b) certification)
Kittery Point Partners, LLC v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 180 A.3d 1091 (Me. 2018) (limitations on piecemeal appellate review; requirements for Rule 54(b) findings)
Beal v. Allstate Ins. Co., 989 A.2d 733 (Me. 2010) (consumer‑protection statutes construed liberally for insureds and strictly against insurers)
Ne. Occupational Exch., Inc. v. State, 540 A.2d 1115 (Me. 1988) (vagueness standard for economic regulations)