Corey v. Secretary, United States Department of Housing & Urban Development ex rel. Walker
719 F.3d 322
4th Cir.2013Background
- Corey, a landlord, advertised a Charleston, WV rental at $600/mo.; Walker family disclosed a disabled brother with autism and mental retardation.
- Corey stated conditions: doctor’s note for Mr. Walker, $1 million renter’s liability insurance, and financial guarantees for any damage.
- Ms. Walker still viewed the property but did not submit an application due to anticipated discrimination.
- Corey rented to a non-disabled tenant and did not impose the same conditions.
- The Department charged FHA violations (disability-based discrimination) and the ALJ initially found no violation; the Secretary reversed, remanded for damages and penalties.
- Final Agency Order denied Corey’s petition and granted the Department’s cross-application for enforcement; petition for review denied, enforcement granted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Corey violated FHA §3604(c) by discriminatory statements. | Corey admits conditions were based on disability; direct statement evidence. | Statements were based on perceived risk, not discriminatory intent. | Yes, direct statements indicating disability-based discrimination. |
| Whether Corey violated FHA §3604(f)(1)/(f)(2) by imposing discriminatory terms. | Direct evidence shows discriminatory terms tied to disability. | Possible mixed motives; income rationale pretext. | Yes, direct evidence supports violations; indirect method unnecessary given direct evidence. |
| Whether §3604(f)(9) direct threat exception applies. | N/A (Department contends exception not met). | Efforts to obtain objective evidence could support exception. | No, no objective evidence of a direct threat; exception does not apply. |
| What standard governs review of agency decision. | Review under arbitrary/capricious or substantial evidence. | Standard requires substantial evidence; defer to agency findings. | Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determinations; deferential review applied. |
| Whether the Secretary properly applied McDonnell Douglas indirect evidence analysis. | Corey argues error in indirect proof analysis. | Direct evidence suffices; indirect method not essential here. | Not necessary to address McDonnell Douglas due to direct-evidence support. |
Key Cases Cited
- Pinchback v. Armistead Homes Corp., 907 F.2d 1447 (4th Cir. 1990) (McDonnell Douglas framework referenced for indirect proof)
- Jancik v. HUD, 44 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 1995) (ordinary-purpose standard for discrimination claims)
- White v. HUD, 475 F.3d 898 (7th Cir. 2007) (ordinary listener standard for §3604(c) statements)
- Kormoczy v. HUD, 53 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 1995) (McDonnell Douglas framework referenced)
- Knox v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 434 F.3d 721 (4th Cir. 2006) (arbitrary/capricious review under APA)
- Almy v. Sebelius, 679 F.3d 297 (4th Cir. 2012) (review standards for agency decisions)
- United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972) (ordinary reader/listener standard context)