Corey Dendy v. State of Tennessee, W2020-01364-CCA-R3-PC

Corey Dendy was indicted on multiple counts including attempted first-degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated robbery; he pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery on December 10, 2018, receiving a 10-year sentence with 85% to be served in confinement; remaining counts were dismissed.
The State’s plea factual basis: victim Jeremiah Lockett was shot during a robbery at his residence and later identified Dendy in a photographic lineup; investigators developed Dendy as suspect C.
Dendy claimed trial counsel was ineffective for failing to contact a putative defense witness, Gregory Bowdery, and argued his guilty plea was not knowing/voluntary because he felt pressured by a one-day plea offer and counsel’s conduct.
At the post-conviction hearing, Bowdery testified he had not identified Dendy to police and that Dendy was not present at the robbery; Bowdery had a criminal history and had not been contacted by defense counsel prior to the plea.
Trial counsel testified he retained an investigator, reviewed discovery with Dendy, attempted to locate witnesses (including Bowdery), believed the State had strong proof (including Lockett’s preliminary hearing testimony), and presented a one-day 10-year/85% plea offer which Dendy accepted after discussion.
The post-conviction court credited counsel, found counsel’s investigation reasonable, concluded Dendy’s plea was voluntary and informed, denied relief, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Ineffective assistance — failure to contact witness (Bowdery)	Counsel failed to locate/contact a critical witness who would have exculpated Dendy.	Counsel hired an investigator, tried to locate Bowdery, reviewed discovery with Dendy; inability to find witness was reasonable.	Court: No deficiency; credited counsel and investigator; claim denied.
Prejudice to guilty-plea decision (would have gone to trial)	But for counsel’s failure to contact Bowdery, Dendy would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on trial.	Dendy acknowledged the plea consequences and risks; solemn in-court plea statements and counsel’s advice undermine claim; no reasonable probability of different result.	Court: No prejudice; Dendy failed to show he would have refused the plea and insisted on trial.
Voluntariness — coercion/time pressure from one-day offer	One-day, no-reset offer and refusal to allow family consultation created coercive duress, rendering plea involuntary.	Dendy affirmed in court that plea was knowing, voluntary, and uncoerced; time pressure and desire to avoid harsher penalty do not equal legal duress.	Court: Plea was knowing and voluntary; time pressure alone did not invalidate plea.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (U.S. 1985) (prejudice in guilty-plea context requires showing would have proceeded to trial)
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (U.S. 1969) (guilty plea must be voluntary and intelligent)
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (U.S. 1970) (defendant may enter a guilty plea while asserting innocence)
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (U.S. 1977) (sustains strong presumption of verity for in-court plea statements)
Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363 (Tenn. 1996) (Tennessee standard adopting Strickland two-prong framework)
Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. 1993) (factors for determining whether a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary)
Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450 (Tenn. 2001) (appellate standard of review for post-conviction factual findings)
Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572 (Tenn. 1997) (role of trial court as factfinder in post-conviction proceedings)
Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn. 1975) (competence standard for counsel in criminal cases)