Corey Amond Wharton v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), 82A05-1609-CR-2244

On June 17, 2016, store security observed Corey Wharton shoplifting at a Dillard's in Evansville; officers confronted him and he resisted a patdown and transport.
State charged Wharton with Level 6 felony theft and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement; jury convicted him of both misdemeanors at trial.
Wharton repeatedly insisted on representing himself, asserting a “Moorish” / foreign-nationality jurisdictional theory and refusing to provide standard identifying information; the court appointed standby counsel.
The trial court warned Wharton of the perils of self-representation and explained potential penalties; Wharton nevertheless elected to proceed pro se and rejected plea offers.
At trial Wharton cross‑examined witnesses, made opening and closing statements, and advanced both the Moorish‑nationality jurisdictional claim and constitutional / procedure-based objections; the court denied his motions and later accepted a guilty plea to an enhanced Level 6 theft for sentencing.
Wharton appealed, arguing his waiver of counsel was not knowing and intelligent because his Moorish‑nationality beliefs showed incompetence and lack of understanding.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Wharton validly waived right to counsel	State: court gave proper Faretta warnings and procedures; waiver was voluntary and informed	Wharton: his waiver was not voluntary/intelligent because his Moorish‑nationality beliefs rendered him incompetent and uninformed	Waiver was voluntary and intelligent; affirmed
Whether Moorish‑nationality claim showed incompetence	State: bizarre claim alone does not establish incompetence	Wharton: belief system demonstrates irrationality and incapacity to waive counsel	Court: isolated unconventional theory does not prove incompetence given his courtroom performance; no incompetence established
Whether hybrid representation was required	State: hybrid representation not permitted; court properly denied mixing counsel and pro se roles	Wharton: wanted standby counsel to make Moorish arguments while he also proceeded pro se	Court: informed Wharton he could not have hybrid representation; Wharton knowingly chose pro se
Whether record showed understanding of risks of self‑representation	State: record, defendant's prior convictions, pro se filings, and courtroom conduct show understanding	Wharton: his beliefs undermined any claimed understanding	Court: factual record (warnings, prior experience, motions, cross‑examination, coherent arguments) supports knowing waiver

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (recognition of the right to self‑representation and requirement that waiver be knowing and intelligent)
Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (no fixed script required; inquiry depends on defendant's sophistication and case context)
Hopper v. State, 957 N.E.2d 613 (discussion of factors for assessing voluntariness and intelligence of a Faretta waiver)