489 P.3d 957
N.M. Ct. App.2021Background
- Plaintiff sued several defendants for malicious abuse of process, civil conspiracy, and prima facie tort after defendants circulated and signed a recall petition regarding the Taos School Board.
- Defendants filed Anti-SLAPP special motions to dismiss under NMSA 1978, § 38-2-9.1, asserting First Amendment petitioning protections; the district court granted those motions.
- Plaintiff appealed; New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed dismissal and held defendants were statutorily entitled to attorney fees under § 38-2-9.1(B), then remanded to the district court.
- On remand defendants sought attorney fees for district-court and appellate work and requested prejudgment interest and a 15% postjudgment interest rate; the district court awarded only district-court fees and postjudgment interest at 8.75%, denying appellate fees and prejudgment interest.
- Defendants appealed the denial of appellate fees and interest rulings; the Court of Appeals reversed the denial of appellate fees, held Anti-SLAPP fees are sanctions (not damages), and affirmed the district court on interest issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Anti‑SLAPP § 38‑2‑9.1(B) authorizes attorney fees for appellate work | Fees awarded apply only to work on the underlying motion in district court, not interlocutory or other appeals | "Defending the action" includes all stages reasonably related to defense, including appeal | Court: § 38‑2‑9.1(B) mandates reasonable fees for all defense-related work, including appellate work; remand to award appellate fees |
| Whether Anti‑SLAPP attorney fees are damages or sanctions | Fees are an element of damages (entitling other remedies like prejudgment interest) | Fees are a statutory sanction to vindicate First Amendment rights, not compensatory damages | Court: Fees are sanctions under the Anti‑SLAPP statute, not damages |
| Whether defendants are entitled to prejudgment interest on awarded attorney fees | If fees are damages, prejudgment interest should apply | Anti‑SLAPP fees are sanctions and statute does not create a damages claim; prejudgment interest not warranted | Court: No prejudgment interest; denial affirmed |
| Proper postjudgment interest rate on the fee award (15% vs 8.75%) | Award should carry 15% because original suit was tortious/bad faith | No record findings that plaintiff acted tortiously, intentionally, or in bad faith; default 8.75% applies | Court: Affirmed 8.75% postjudgment interest; higher rate requires supporting findings |
Key Cases Cited
- Cordova v. Cline, 396 P.3d 159 (N.M. 2017) (New Mexico Supreme Court upheld dismissal under Anti‑SLAPP and recognized statutory entitlement to fees)
- Los Lobos Renewable Power, LLC v. AmeriCulture, Inc., 885 F.3d 659 (10th Cir. 2018) (interpreting Anti‑SLAPP fees as sanctions to vindicate First Amendment rights)
- Marbob Energy Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm’n, 206 P.3d 135 (N.M. 2009) (statutory use of "shall" signals mandatory award of fees)
- Superior Concrete Pumping, Inc. v. David Montoya Constr., Inc., 773 P.2d 346 (N.M. 1989) (New Mexico precedent awarding appellate fees under statute despite lack of explicit appellate language)
- Hale v. Basin Motor Co., 795 P.2d 1006 (N.M. 1990) (awarding appellate fees under statutory scheme without explicit appellate-fee language)
- Lenz v. Chalamidas, 782 P.2d 85 (N.M. 1989) (principle that attorney fees are not recoverable as damages absent statutory authority)