61 Cal. 4th 1099
Cal.2015Background
- A high-speed collision on Colorado Boulevard in Los Angeles caused a Nissan to be forced onto a grassy center median and strike a magnolia tree, killing four passengers and injuring a fifth. The other driver, Rostislav Shnayder, was convicted of vehicular manslaughter.
- Plaintiffs (parents of three deceased occupants) sued the City of Los Angeles under Gov. Code § 835, alleging the median trees were too close to traffic and constituted a dangerous condition that proximately caused the fatal injuries.
- The City moved for summary judgment; trial court sustained evidentiary objections to plaintiffs’ expert evidence and accident data, and held the tree was not a dangerous condition because it did not cause the third party’s negligent driving.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning plaintiffs needed to show the tree caused or encouraged Shnayder’s negligent conduct.
- The California Supreme Court granted review to decide whether § 835 requires plaintiffs to prove the dangerous condition caused the third party conduct that precipitated the injury; the Court reversed the Court of Appeal and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 835 requires proof that a dangerous condition caused the third party’s harmful conduct | Cordova: No — plaintiff must show the dangerous condition proximately caused the injury, not that it caused the third party’s negligence | City: Yes — entity not liable unless condition caused, facilitated, or encouraged the third party conduct | Held: No — § 835 requires that a dangerous condition proximately cause the injury, but not that it cause the third party’s conduct (reversed and remanded) |
| Whether a condition that exacerbates injury (but did not cause the initiating harm) can support § 835 liability | Cordova: A condition that substantially increases injury severity can be a proximate cause if it creates a foreseeable risk of that kind of injury | City: Liability should be limited to conditions that increase probability of an accident, not merely its severity | Held: § 835 draws no categorical distinction; a condition that substantially increases the injury can support liability if it meets the dangerous-condition and proximate-cause requirements (merits on remand) |
Key Cases Cited
- Ducey v. Argo Sales Co., 25 Cal.3d 707 (1979) (state could be liable where absence of median barrier contributed to injuries from cross-median collision)
- Zelig v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal.4th 1112 (2002) (public-entity liability for criminal third-party acts requires causal relation when theory alleges property facilitated the criminal act)
- Bonnano v. Central Contra Costa Transit Authority, 30 Cal.4th 139 (2003) (definition of dangerous condition under § 830 and related principles)
- Hayes v. State of California, 11 Cal.3d 469 (1974) (public entity not ordinarily liable for third-party harmful conduct absent a dangerous condition)
- Lane v. City of Sacramento, 183 Cal.App.4th 1337 (2010) (injury proximately caused by dangerous condition sufficient; need not show condition caused driver’s evasive conduct)
- Cole v. Town of Los Gatos, 205 Cal.App.4th 749 (2012) (rejected requirement that dangerous condition must cause third-party conduct in all cases)
- City of San Diego v. Superior Court, 137 Cal.App.4th 21 (2006) (summary judgment where plaintiffs failed to connect lack of lighting to third-party street-racing conduct)
- Constance B. v. State of California, 178 Cal.App.3d 200 (1986) (claim failed where condition did not proximately cause plaintiff’s injury)