Cordarryl Lamond Bell a/k/a Cordarryl Bell v. State of Mississippi, 303 So.3d 22

Cordarryl Bell was indicted for first-degree murder (Aquarius Nelson) and aggravated assault (Joshua Cole) after Bell shot Nelson multiple times on November 2, 2015; no weapon was recovered from the vehicle and only Bell’s shell casings were found.
Bell claimed self-defense, testifying he feared Nelson—based on community rumors that Nelson had killed Bridget London—and believed Nelson was about to draw a gun.
The first trial hung; at retrial the jury convicted Bell of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter and aggravated assault.
Bell moved for JNOV or a new trial; the trial court denied relief and imposed consecutive prison terms (20 years for manslaughter; 20 years with 10 suspended for aggravated assault) plus post-release supervision.
On appeal Bell raised three principal claims: (1) the court improperly limited testimony about Nelson’s alleged involvement in Bridget London’s death; (2) the court abused its discretion by denying a mistrial after a prosecutor’s remark; and (3) the court refused a requested perjury instruction.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding uncorroborated rumor evidence, in curing the prosecutor’s remark by admonition rather than declaring a mistrial, or in refusing the perjury instruction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Bell)	Held
1) Exclusion of testimony that Nelson "killed Bridget London"	The testimony was improper character/rumor evidence and not admissible under Rule 404(b) without first‑hand knowledge or corroboration.	The rumor was admissible to show Bell’s state of mind (fear) under Rule 404(b).	Exclusion upheld; court allowed testimony about Bell’s fear but properly excluded unsubstantiated rumor about Nelson.
2) Denial of mistrial after prosecutor said "I know" Cole was in the car	The prosecutor’s comment was a permissible inference from evidence and not prejudicial.	The comment implied extra-record knowledge by the prosecutor and warranted a mistrial.	Denial of mistrial affirmed; objection sustained and jury admonished—no reversible prejudice.
3) Refusal to give perjury jury instruction	The perjury instruction was unnecessary; credibility instructions already covered the issue and no perjury charge existed.	Cole’s inconsistencies required heightened-perjury instruction so jury would scrutinize his testimony.	Refusal affirmed; proposed instruction was legally deficient, unsupported by evidence, and duplicative.

Newell v. State, 175 So. 3d 1260 (Miss. 2015) (abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings)
Richardson v. State, 147 So. 3d 838 (Miss. 2014) (victim’s violent history may be admissible to support self‑defense/state of mind when based on first‑hand knowledge)
Jordan v. State, 211 So. 3d 713 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (prior violent acts known to defendant admissible under Rule 404(b) for state of mind)
McDonald v. State, 538 So. 2d 778 (Miss. 1989) (proof of victim’s bad reputation for violence admissible on aggressor issue)
Mack v. State, 650 So. 2d 1289 (Miss. 1994) (prosecutor’s use of "I know" can imply outside knowledge; may be harmless)
Sheppard v. State, 777 So. 2d 659 (Miss. 2000) (prosecutorial comments outside the record can be prejudicial and reversible)
Caston v. State, 823 So. 2d 473 (Miss. 2002) (context for permissible prosecutorial argument)
Alexander v. State, 602 So. 2d 1180 (Miss. 1992) (jury admonition can cure improper prosecutorial remarks)