Cora Mitchell v. City of Warren, MI
803 F.3d 223
6th Cir.2015Background
- In April 2009, 16-year-old Robert Mitchell was tased by Warren, MI officers; two X26 darts struck his chest, he suffered ventricular fibrillation and died; his mother sued.
- Mitchell settled claims against the City and individual officers and pursued products-liability and negligence claims against Taser International (failure to warn about chest shots causing cardiac arrest; negligent training/warnings).
- Taser moved for summary judgment; district court granted summary judgment on grounds that (1) no pre-sale duty to warn under Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2948(3), (2) no post-sale duty under Michigan law, (3) no assumed duty via training, and (4) lack of proof officer would have seen any warning.
- Central factual/scientific evidence: extensive field use of X26s with few documented human cardiac arrests pre-2006; animal (pig) studies (Tchou/Lakkireddy and Nanthakumar, published Aug. 2006) showed cardiac "capture" and one VF in 150 trials under stressed/artificial conditions, but did not establish a human cardiac-arrest risk with the standard X26 discharge.
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed: under Michigan statute a manufacturer is liable for failure to warn only if it "knew or should have known" of the risk based on information reasonably available when the specific unit left its control; the available evidence before the August 2006 sale was at most speculative and did not impose a duty to warn.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-sale duty to warn under Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2948(3) | Taser should have warned police that chest shots risk cardiac arrest based on published animal studies and other evidence available by Aug 17, 2006 | Scientific and field evidence before sale did not show a realistic risk of cardiac arrest from a standard X26 chest shot; only speculative/possible risk existed | No duty to warn pre-sale; evidence before sale was insufficient as a matter of law to show Taser "knew or should have known" of cardiac-arrest risk |
| Post-sale duty to warn (later studies/info) | Subsequent studies and information impose a continuing duty to warn users of new risks | § 600.2948(3) limits relevant information to that "reasonably available" when the unit left manufacturer's control; Comstock does not revive a broader post-sale duty here | Post-sale duty-to-warn claim barred by § 600.2948(3); Comstock does not compel a different outcome |
| Assumed continuing duty via training/materials | Taser’s training and updates created a special relationship and an ongoing duty to warn customers of emerging risks | No unique/controlling relationship existed; training was provided by an independent contractor and did not create a perpetual duty; causation lacking (no proof WPD or officer would have changed conduct) | No assumed continuing duty from training; summary judgment for Taser affirmed |
| Negligence (independent of product liability) | Taser negligently marketed and continued to instruct aiming at center mass after it knew/should have known of risks | Same defects as product claims; absence of foreseeable knowledge pre-sale; lack of causation and no special duty post-sale | Negligence claim fails — no duty and no causation shown; summary judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Comstock v. Gen. Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163 (Mich. 1959) (recognized a post-sale duty to warn of latent defects discovered shortly after sale)
- Gregory v. Cincinnati Inc., 450 Mich. 1 (Mich. 1995) (discusses when a continuing duty to warn or special relationship may arise)
- Glittenberg v. Doughboy Recreational Indus., 441 Mich. 379 (Mich. 1992) (warning obligation limited to risks with a real probability and significant impact)
- Rodriguez v. Stryker Corp., 680 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2012) (manufacturer knowledge of one risk does not permit inference of knowledge of a different risk)
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (U.S. 1993) (scientific certainty not required, but courts exclude expert opinion when an analytical gap exists)
- Fontenot v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 736 F.3d 318 (4th Cir. 2013) (jury verdict finding failure-to-warn liability based in part on the same 2006 studies; persuasive but applied under North Carolina law)
- Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (U.S. 1997) (courts may exclude expert testimony when too great an analytical gap exists)