Copsey v. Park
160 A.3d 623
| Md. | 2017Background
- On June 4, 2010 radiologist John S. Park interpreted Mr. Copsey’s ED CT and MRI/MRA as normal; Mr. Copsey was discharged and later diagnosed with migraines.
- Between June 9–10 Mr. Copsey returned with worsening symptoms; new imaging identified an acute lateral medullary infarct but treating physicians (Drs. Blum, Viswanathan, Alkaitis) did not timely act or notify the patient, and Mr. Copsey suffered a major stroke on June 10 and died June 13.
- Petitioners (Copsey family) sued Dr. Park and three subsequent treating physicians; prior to trial they settled with and dismissed two neurologists and, after trial began, dismissed the radiologist, leaving Dr. Park as the sole defendant at trial.
- Petitioners moved in limine to exclude evidence that the subsequent treating physicians had been defendants or settled, and to preclude Dr. Park from arguing their negligence was an intervening/superseding cause; the trial court denied both motions.
- The jury found for Dr. Park (no breach); the Court of Special Appeals affirmed, and the Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari and affirmed the denial of the motions in limine and the jury’s verdict.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of evidence of non-party physicians’ negligence (and their former defendant/settlement status) | Evidence of non-party negligence and settlements is irrelevant and prejudicial; it distracts from Park’s conduct | Evidence of non-party negligence and their status is relevant and necessary to show an alternate cause and to allow a full defense | Admissible: Martinez permits a defendant who generally denies liability to present non-party negligence and causation; probative value outweighed prejudice |
| Whether Dr. Park may argue subsequent physicians’ negligence was an intervening/superseding cause | Subsequent delays/omissions were foreseeable and part of a continuous chain — multiple physicians’ conduct combined to cause death, so superseding cause instruction inappropriate | Failures of subsequent treating physicians were independent, extraordinary, and not reasonably foreseeable, breaking causal chain | Court permitted superseding-cause defense; causation is for jury; reasonable evidence supported jury’s conclusion that Park was not negligent and that later acts could supersede |
| Whether jury instructions on superseding cause were adequate | Instruction improperly allowed jury to find a superseding cause despite concurrent negligence and indivisible injury | Instruction fairly stated the law; jury decides foreseeability and extraordinary nature of intervening acts | Instructions were adequate: law was fairly covered and no reversible error shown |
| Whether allowing testimony about non-parties’ prior status would require reversal | Such evidence invites impermissible speculation that settling non-parties were guilty and Dr. Park was innocent | Jury can weigh credibility; cautionary instructions can mitigate speculation; exclusion would deny defendant a fair presentation | No reversible error: trial court did not abuse discretion; judge could and did manage prejudice through instruction if requested |
Key Cases Cited
- Martinez ex rel. Fielding v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 212 Md. App. 634 (2013) (permits admission of non-party negligence and causation when defendant generally denies liability)
- Hartford Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn of Bethesda, Inc., 335 Md. 135 (1994) (intervening act breaks causal chain when extraordinary and unforeseeable)
- Pittway Corp. v. Collins, 409 Md. 218 (2009) (adopts Restatement substantial-factor test and Restatement factors for superseding cause analysis)
- Mehlman v. Powell, 281 Md. 269 (1977) (concurrent negligence may produce a continuous causal chain; subsequent omissions may not be superseding when events are continuous)