Copeland Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Estate of Dillard
267 Or. App. 791
Or. Ct. App.2014Background
- 1954 warranty deed from Angeline Dillard to Sunny Valley Lumber Co. conveyed ~120 acres but reserved "all minerals in, under and upon the premises" with exclusive right to mine and remove them.
- Reservation later conveyed to defendant Skidmore; plaintiff Copeland owns surface title and intends to extract rock to produce construction-grade gravel.
- Plaintiff sued to quiet title and obtain declaratory relief that the reservation did not include sand, gravel, or other rock/earth materials used for construction.
- Trial court granted plaintiff’s summary judgment, holding the reservation excluded sand, gravel, and rock used for construction; defendant appealed only that part.
- On appeal, the court applied Yogman’s three-step contract/deed interpretation framework: (1) text/context, (2) extrinsic evidence, (3) maxims of construction. The court found the term "minerals" ambiguous and no extrinsic evidence to resolve it.
- Applying constructional maxims (construe ambiguities against the grantor and ORS 42.260), the court held the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the holder of the reservation (defendant) and reversed the portion of the judgment excluding rock used for construction; remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does a 1954 reservation of "all minerals" in a deed exclude sand, gravel, and rock used for construction? | Whittle and some authority: "minerals" excludes sand, gravel, and common construction rock. | "Minerals" includes common rock (e.g., basalt); statutory and dictionary meanings support inclusion. | Term "minerals"ambiguous; no extrinsic evidence; ambiguity construed for defendant — reservation includes common rock used for construction. |
| Does Whittle control to categorically exclude construction rock from mineral reservations? | Whittle precludes sand/gravel from subsurface reservations and supports exclusion generally. | Whittle was limited to its deed/nature of mining; it does not establish a categorical rule. | Whittle is not dispositive; it is context-specific and does not create a per se rule excluding construction rock. |
| Can the court decide this ambiguous deed on summary judgment absent extrinsic evidence? | Plaintiff: yes — argue ambiguity resolved by precedent and context. | Defendant: no if ambiguity should be resolved in favor of reservation holder. | No extrinsic evidence exists; applying maxims of construction resolves ambiguity on law, permitting reversal. |
| Which maxims govern ambiguous deed language here? | Implicitly favors surface owner/market-value interpretation. | Ambiguity construed against grantor; statutory rule favors party in whose favor provision was made. | Maxims (construe ambiguity against grantor / ORS 42.260) favor defendant (holder of reserved mineral interest). |
Key Cases Cited
- Whittle v. Wolff, 249 Or 217 (1968) (interpreting a specific subsurface reservation to exclude sand and gravel; emphasizes deed-specific context)
- Yogman v. Parrott, 325 Or 358 (1997) (establishes three-step framework for interpreting contracts/deeds: text/context, extrinsic evidence, maxims)
- Verzeano v. Carpenter, 108 Or App 258 (1991) (ambiguities in deeds construed against the grantor; applies to reservations)
- Loney v. Scott, 57 Or 378 (1910) (recognizes building sand as a "mineral" under federal mining law; evidences varied historical meanings)
- Groshong v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 329 Or 303 (1999) (dictionary definitions may supply plain and ordinary meaning of contract terms)