835 S.E.2d 516
S.C.2019Background
- Three siblings were placed in foster care: two (Children 1 & 2) originally with Palazzo (2015) and one (Child 3) with the Coopers (2016); by oral argument all three were with the Coopers after allegations against Palazzo led to a February 2019 removal pending investigation.
- DSS commenced separate removal actions for Children 1–2 and Child 3; foster parents (Palazzo and the Coopers) filed private petitions seeking termination of parental rights (TPR) and adoption for the children in their care.
- Foster Parents moved in the family court to (1) intervene in the DSS removal actions, (2) consolidate the private TPR/adoption actions with the DSS removal actions, (3) obtain joinder where appropriate, and (4) obtain temporary custody/placement; the family court summarily denied all motions without findings and denied reconsideration.
- Experts and the volunteer guardian ad litem (GAL) submitted affidavits supporting continuity of placement with the foster parents and warning that removal would harm the children; the Foster Care Review Board also recommended intervention and TPR/adoption as the permanency plan.
- On appeal the South Carolina Supreme Court held the family court erred by denying intervention (Rule 24(b)(2) analysis), remanded consolidation for reconsideration in light of DSS’s changed position, affirmed denial of joinder as moot or unnecessary in certain respects, and ordered interim placement directives to minimize disruption to the children.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether foster parents may intervene in DSS removal actions | Foster Parents: timely motions; have common questions of law/fact (TPR, adoption, custody, children’s welfare); intervention needed to protect adoption prospects | DSS: intervention is permissive, not automatic; would complicate proceedings (later withdrew opposition) | Reversed family court; intervention should be permitted under Rule 24(b)(2) given common questions and lack of undue delay or prejudice |
| Whether private TPR/adoption actions should be consolidated with DSS removal actions | Foster Parents: consolidation promotes judicial economy, avoids inconsistent rulings, and lets court decide best interests with all parties present | DSS & GAL: consolidation raises procedural/role conflicts (volunteer GAL role differs in private actions); consolidation could complicate litigation | Remanded for family court to reconsider consolidation promptly, factoring DSS’s changed position and GAL concerns |
| Whether Foster Parents must be joined as parties in the DSS removal actions | Foster Parents: required for just adjudication to protect their interests and adoption prospects | DSS: intervention suffices; joinder not mandatory | Mooted by grant of intervention; court declined to rule on joinder because intervention resolves the practical issue |
| Whether DSS must be joined to the Coopers’ private TPR petition | Coopers: statutory duty requires DSS to join when child in state custody 15 of last 22 months | DSS: (no opposition on appeal) | Affirmed family court: joinder unnecessary because DSS was already named as a defendant in the Coopers’ petition |
| Whether the family court must state findings and consider children’s best interests when denying procedural motions | Foster Parents: family court must set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law, and consider best interests when rulings affect children | Family court: issued summary denials without findings | Court emphasized Rule 26/SCRFC: family court must set forth pertinent findings and consider best interests; absence of findings warranted reversal/remand on intervention and reconsideration on consolidation |
Key Cases Cited
- Stoney v. Stoney, 422 S.C. 593 (2018) (abuse of discretion standard for family court evidentiary/procedural rulings)
- Ex Parte Gov't Emp.'s Ins. Co. v. Goethe, 373 S.C. 132 (2007) (intervention rules should be liberally construed when judicial economy is promoted)
- Davis v. Jennings, 304 S.C. 502 (1991) (timeliness test for intervention: four-part analysis)
- Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100 (D.C. 1988) (source of the four-part timeliness test cited in Davis)
- Sloan v. Dep't of Transp., 379 S.C. 160 (2008) (mootness doctrine principles)
- Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557 (2001) (exceptions to mootness in the civil context)