Cooper v. New York State Department of Labor
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 7588
| 2d Cir. | 2016Background
- Cooper was Director of Equal Opportunity Development at NY DOL; her duties included ensuring compliance with federal EEO rules.
- In Dec. 2012 GOER proposed altering how internal EEO complaints were handled; Cooper objected, arguing the plan would invite political pressure and risk unredressed discrimination.
- Cooper communicated her concerns to supervisors; GOER’s plan was modified to reflect her views.
- In April 2013 Cooper was removed from her DEOD position; she sued claiming retaliatory discharge under Title VII and the NYSHRL.
- The District Court dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); the Second Circuit reviewed de novo and affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Cooper’s lobbying against GOER’s procedural changes constituted protected activity under Title VII/NYSHRL (i.e., she reasonably believed the conduct opposed was an “unlawful employment practice”) | Cooper argued she reasonably believed the procedural change would increase the likelihood that discrimination claims would go unredressed, so opposing it was protected opposition to an unlawful practice | Defendant argued Title VII defines specific substantive unlawful practices (status-based discrimination, etc.) and does not impose requirements about internal complaint procedures; opposing such procedural changes is not protected | The court held Cooper could not reasonably have believed the proposal itself was an "unlawful employment practice" under Title VII (and thus NYSHRL) and affirmed dismissal |
| Whether Title VII’s anti-retaliation clause should be construed broadly to protect opposition to policies that might increase future discrimination | Cooper urged a broad remedial reading to cover her opposition | Defendant emphasized statutory text limits protected activity to opposing practices that are themselves unlawful under the statute | Court refused to expand protection beyond statutory text and precedents; broad remedial purposes do not override statutory limits |
Key Cases Cited
- Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2013) (plaintiff must have a good-faith, reasonable belief that opposed conduct is unlawful to trigger protection)
- Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (U.S. 2013) (Title VII defines unlawful employment practices with precision)
- Manoharan v. Columbia Univ. Coll. of Physicians & Surgeons, 842 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1988) (opposing employer’s failure to follow its own affirmative-action plan is not protected activity under Title VII)
- King v. Jackson, 487 F.3d 970 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (refusal to continue an affirmative-employment plan is not itself discriminatory hiring and is not protected opposition)
- CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175 (U.S. 2014) (courts must interpret statutes according to text and structure, not solely remedial purpose)