391 P.3d 338
Utah Ct. App.2016Background
- In August 2014 Val and Richard Cooper sued Nate and Jen Dressel for unpaid rent, damages, and fees after the Dressels vacated a leased property early.
- The Coopers located a forwarding address for the Dressels in Sequim, Washington (the Sequim Address) via the post office and online records, and hired a process server who filed an affidavit claiming service on Mrs. McKellar at that address on September 26, 2014.
- Mrs. McKellar later filed an affidavit stating she refused to accept papers and that the Dressels did not reside at the Sequim Address; the Dressels submitted affidavits denying residence there and saying they did not receive notice of the lawsuit until after default judgment.
- The district court entered default judgment against the Dressels on November 13, 2014, for $13,005.70 and mailed notice of entry of judgment to the Sequim Address; the Dressels received that notice by mail and moved to set aside the default judgment on grounds including insufficient service and Rule 60(b).
- The district court found (in a single-sentence written finding and oral ruling) that the Sequim Address was the Dressels’ "usual place of abode" and that personal (substitute) service was effective; it denied the Rule 60(b) relief.
- On appeal the Dressels argued service was defective because the Sequim Address was only a mail-forwarding address and they did not actually reside there; the Court of Appeals reversed, holding service was not accomplished and vacating the default judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Coopers) | Defendant's Argument (Dressels) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether personal service via leaving papers at the Sequim Address satisfied Utah R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1)(A) ("usual place of abode") | Sequim was the Dressels’ forwarding address; mail forwarding and notice receipt show it was their usual place of abode and provided notice | Sequim was only a forwarding/mail address; affidavits establish the Dressels did not live there when service was attempted and never received timely notice of the suit | Sequim was not the Dressels’ usual place of abode; substitute personal service was defective; judgment void for lack of personal jurisdiction; reversed and vacated |
| Whether Rule 60(b)(1) relief should have been granted for mistake/excusable neglect | Default judgment was valid because service was proper; relief inappropriate | Default arose from defective service and lack of actual notice; relief warranted | Court did not decide Rule 60(b) claim on the merits because defective service required vacatur; remanded for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1991) (discusses standards for determining a party's "usual place of abode" and review of service findings)
- Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (judgment entered without personal jurisdiction is void)
- Judson v. Wheeler RV Las Vegas, LLC, 270 P.3d 456 (Utah 2012) (addresses jurisdictional consequences of defective service)
- Cooke v. Cooke, 22 P.3d 1249 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) (process-server return of service is presumptively correct like a sheriff's return)
- Earle v. McVeigh, 91 U.S. 503 (U.S. 1875) (notice posted at a location after vacatur is not a defendant's usual place of abode; judgment on such notice is void)