829 F. Supp. 2d 1208
M.D. Fla.2011Background
- This suit arises from a July 18, 2008 motorcycle crash in Pinellas County, Florida; Prado died and Cook, a passenger, was injured.
- Sparks, an alcoholic beverage containing caffeine, was manufactured and sold by MillerCoors.
- Cook filed suit in state court on June 6, 2011 seeking damages based on alleged inherent danger, design defect, and negligent manufacture related to Sparks.
- MillerCoors removed the action to federal court on diversity grounds and moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
- Cook’s complaint asserts four counts: failure to warn (Count I), design defect (Count II), negligent manufacture (Count III), and auto negligence against Prado’s Estate (Count IV).
- The Estate of Prado is alleged to be fraudulently joined and, if so, would destroy diversity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Cook’s failure-to-warn claim is viable. | Cook contends Sparks’ stimulants mask intoxication and require warning. | MillerCoors argues alcohol risks are obvious; no duty to warn; preemption under federal labeling statute. | Count I dismissed for lack of duty to warn; no preemption applied to bar the claim. |
| Whether Sparks’ design defect claim is viable. | Adding stimulants makes Sparks unreasonably dangerous due to lack of FDA GRAS recognition. | Sparks is not unreasonably dangerous; existing Florida law treats alcohol as well-known risks. | Count II dismissed for failure to show unreasonably dangerous design; leave to amend. |
| Whether Cook can state a negligence claim for manufacturing Sparks. | MillerCoors owed a duty to manufacturing safe products and to prevent foreseeable harm. | No duty to protect third parties from harms caused by a consumer’s intoxication; proximate cause lies with Prado’s drinking. | Count III dismissed for lack of duty and proximate cause; prejudice. |
| Whether the Estate of Prado was properly joined and its presence affects federal jurisdiction. | Estate should be subject to claims; removal legitimate if not fraudulently joined. | Estate was fraudulently joined; time-barred under Florida law; improper service. | Estate fraudulently joined; jurisdiction proper; with Counts I-III viable, the Court proceeds. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (plausibility standard for pleading claims)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (reasonable inference required for pleading cogent claims)
- Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (U.S. 1986) (courts accept factual allegations as true on Rule 12(b)(6))
- Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2004) (standard for reviewing 12(b)(6) dismissals)
- Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 1998) (fraudulent joinder burden and evaluation)
- Ellis v. N.G.N. of Tampa, Inc., 586 So.2d 1042 (Fla. 1991) (statutory exceptions to liability for sale of alcohol)
- Publix Supermarkets, Inc. v. Austin, 658 So.2d 1064 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (statutory limitations on negligence under Fla. Stat. § 768.125)
- McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So.2d 500 (Fla. 1992) (duty analysis in proximity to harm and risk)
- West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1976) (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A defect standard for products)