Cook v. Cook, 249 P.3d 1070

Michael and Rebecca Cook, during their 2002 divorce, divided two corporations’ stock and executed a partial settlement agreement providing fixed and contingent payment terms.
The Agreement awarded Michael all stock and required monthly payments to Rebecca: $1,000/month for five years, then $2,000/month plus potential credits from corporate profits, with a 15-year term for the latter and an overall principal of $675,000 under 8% interest.
Paragraph 2.b provided that after May 1, 2007, Michael would pay $2,000/month and, if Michael’s after-tax corporate income exceeded $40,000, half the excess would be paid toward principal; the structure included three tiers and a 15-year cap for the $2,000 payments.
Drafts prior toMay 2002 varied, with Rebecca proposing a $750,000 note and different terms; the final May 2002 Agreement reduced Rebecca’s share to a $675,000 principal and capped the $2,000 payments at 15 years.
In 2008 Rebecca moved to reduce the amount owed under the Agreement to judgment due to delinquency, and Michael sought relief arguing the payments depended on profitability and that the Agreement should be dissolved or reformed.
The superior court concluded the $2,000/month obligation was not contingent on profitability, while the 2.b provision tied only the excess income over $40,000 to additional payments; judgment against Michael totaled $47,132.46 plus interest.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is the $2,000 per month obligation contingent on profitability?	Cook contends 2.b is profitability-based and not mandatory if profits do not materialize.	Cook argues profitability is required for all 2.b payments, including the fixed $2,000/month.	No; 2.b is not contingent on profitability; fixed $2,000/month applies regardless of profits.
Was there mutual mistake of fact warranting relief?	Michael argues both parties misvalued the stock, warranting rescission or reformation.	Rebecca contends valuation of future profits was a forecast, not a past/present fact error.	No mutual mistake; future-value estimates are not rescissible mistakes.
Did unclean hands justify relief from obligations?	Rebecca allegedly sabotaged investor relations; Michael seeks relief under unclean hands.	There is no evidence showing a concrete impact on investors from Rebecca’s conduct.	No abuse of discretion; unclean hands defense is not supported by the record.
Was duress properly considered or waived?	Michael asserted duress influenced entering the Agreement.	Duress claim was not adequately argued or supported by the record; counsel did not pursue it.	No error; the court properly declined to exonerate based on duress.

Burns v. Burns, 157 P.3d 1037 (Alaska 2007) (contract interpretation and finality in division of marital assets)
Norton v. Herron, 677 P.2d 877 (Alaska 1984) (contract interpretation; credibility and extrinsic evidence considerations)
Stormont v. Astoria Ltd., 889 P.2d 1059 (Alaska 1995) (mutual mistake of fact in contracts; future predictions not rescission)
Knutson v. Bitterroot Int'l Sys., Inc., 5 P.3d 554 (Mont. 2000) (mutual mistake as to value; material but not dispositive for rescission)
Ryan v. Ryan, 640 S.E.2d 64 (W. Va. 2006) (denying divorce agreement reform for mistaken asset expectations)