Cooch v. S & D River Island, LLC
85 A.3d 888
Md. Ct. Spec. App.2014Background
- Plaintiff Debra Cooch, a tenant, sued landlord/manager for negligence after a 2010 bedbug infestation; jury found duty and breach but no causation and awarded no damages.
- After verdict, plaintiff’s attorney spoke with juror A.B., who said he had done online research about fumigation and believed Cooch should not have discarded her property; attorney submitted an affidavit recounting that conversation.
- Plaintiff moved for a partial new trial on damages, arguing a juror’s independent Internet research improperly influenced the verdict.
- Trial judge denied the motion, finding the affidavit unreliable on timing and effect and that prejudice was not shown; plaintiff appealed.
- The appellate court reviewed whether post-verdict juror-sourced evidence (via counsel’s affidavit) was admissible under Lord Mansfield’s Rule/Maryland Rule 5-606(b) and whether prejudice should be presumed (invoking Jenkins).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether juror A.B.’s post-verdict statements (relayed by counsel) may be used to impeach the verdict | A.B.’s statements show extraneous investigation (online research) that influenced verdict and justify a new trial | Juror statements about deliberations are barred; only limited extraneous evidence may be considered and counsel’s affidavit is insufficient | Most of A.B.’s statements were inadmissible under Rule 5-606(b); only the claim he did online research and found fumigation services was potentially admissible, but rest barred |
| Whether the court should presume prejudice from the juror’s impropriety (apply Jenkins/Remmer) | Jenkins supports presumptive prejudice when juror acquires outside information | Jenkins is criminal-law specific; civil cases follow Wernsing requiring proof of probable prejudice | Presumption of prejudice (Jenkins/Remmer) does not apply in civil cases; Wernsing’s proof-of-probable-prejudice standard controls |
| Whether the affidavit produced sufficient proof that the extraneous research occurred during trial and affected deliberations | The juror’s admission to counsel suffices to show in-trial research and influence on damages deliberations | The affidavit lacks timing detail; no evidence it was shared or affected other jurors; moving party bears burden to prove probable prejudice | Plaintiff failed to prove timing or that the information was shared or probably affected the verdict; judge’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous |
| Whether trial court abused its discretion in denying a new trial | The denial ignored the juror misconduct and Jenkins precedent | Court followed Maryland precedent (Wernsing, Rule 5-606) and reasonably found no probable prejudice | No abuse of discretion; judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Wernsing v. General Motors Corp., 298 Md. 406 (1984) (civil standard: extraneous jury information does not automatically presume prejudice; trial judge must assess probability of prejudice)
- Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284 (2003) (criminal context; held juror–witness midtrial contact was inherently prejudicial and reversed conviction)
- Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954) (criminal precedent characterizing private contact with jurors as presumptively prejudicial)
- Harford Sands, Inc. v. Groft, 320 Md. 136 (1990) (distinguishes admissible extraneous juror conduct from inadmissible deliberative matters; juror testimony about external conduct admissible but not about deliberations)
- McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915) (traces Lord Mansfield’s Rule and the historic bar on juror testimony to impeach verdict)