778 F.3d 97
2d Cir.2015Background
- Defendant Walkins Contreras was convicted in New York state court of rape, burglary, unlawful imprisonment and related charges based on violent acts on Feb. 10, 2004.
- Police recovered a notepad (the "Note") from the complainant Y.A.'s purse; the Note contained sexually explicit bullet points and appeared to concern a new boyfriend.
- On the morning of jury selection the prosecutor sought a protective order to exclude and withhold the Note; the trial court held an in camera, initially ex parte, hearing to determine Rosario/Brady disclosure issues.
- The court allowed defense counsel to review the Note and to question the complainant in camera but ordered counsel not to reveal the Note or the hearing’s substance to Contreras during the trial; the court excluded the Note from evidence.
- Contreras was convicted and sentenced; the New York appellate courts affirmed (holding the Note irrelevant and the nondisclosure procedure reasonable). He then filed a federal habeas petition arguing violations of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel (Geders/Perry) and his due process/right-to-be-present (Stincer/Gagnon/Snyder).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court's order prohibiting defense counsel from disclosing the Note and hearing substance to Contreras violated the Sixth Amendment right to consult counsel | Contreras: ban spanned the entire trial and was broader in duration than Geders; therefore it unreasonably restricted attorney-client communication | State: order was narrow in subject (only Note/hearing) and allowed counsel to communicate on other matters and to cross-examine the witness; Geders/Perry do not control | Court: AEDPA deference applies; order not an unreasonable application of Geders/Perry because it was limited in scope, could be terminated if defendant showed prior knowledge, and differed materially from Geders ban |
| Whether excluding Contreras from the in camera admissibility hearing denied his due process/right to be present at a critical stage | Contreras: absence prevented him from assisting counsel and confronting witness about the Note; presence was necessary for fairness | State: counsel could cross-examine, defendant had no personal knowledge of the Note, and in camera review is appropriate to determine Brady/Rosario material without disclosure | Court: No violation—under Stincer/Gagnon/Snyder defendant's presence is required only when it would contribute to fairness; here it would not have added anything material |
| Whether the state courts unreasonably found the Note irrelevant (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)) | Contreras: the Note was potentially relevant to consent and motive and the state courts’ factual conclusions were indefensible | State: relevance is a discretionary legal determination; record showed Note concerned another man and no evidence defendant ever saw it | Court: Relevance is not a pure factual finding but a discretionary judgment; state courts’ conclusions were reasonable and supported by record; § 2254(d)(2) claim fails |
| Whether federal habeas relief is available given AEDPA deference to state-court adjudications | Contreras: his constitutional claims required independent federal review; state courts unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent | State: AEDPA requires deference; state rulings were neither contrary to nor unreasonable applications of Supreme Court holdings | Court: AEDPA standard not met; habeas petition denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (U.S. 1976) (17-hour ban on defendant–counsel communications during overnight recess violated Sixth Amendment)
- Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (U.S. 1989) (short recess ban on defendant–counsel communication during testimony did not violate Sixth Amendment)
- Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (U.S. 1987) (defendant’s presence required only when it would contribute to fairness of proceedings)
- United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522 (U.S. 1985) (absence from limited proceeding does not violate right to be present if defendant’s presence would add nothing)
- Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (U.S. 1934) (defendant need not be present at proceedings that would not affect fairness of trial)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (U.S. 1963) (prosecution must disclose evidence favorable to defendant when material to guilt or punishment)