Contrera v. Langer
278 F. Supp. 3d 702
S.D.N.Y.2017Background
- Five named plaintiffs (superintendents, handymen, a porter) allege they were paid flat weekly sums and denied overtime and minimum-wage protections while working for a multi-entity real estate operation they call the “E & M Enterprise.”
- Plaintiffs named four individuals and 160+ corporate entities (investment, management, title-holding) and submitted declarations, paystubs, ID cards, payroll memoranda (StaffPro/StaffE & M), and deposition excerpts showing centralized payroll/management.
- Plaintiffs and other employees picked up paychecks and attended meetings at a Bronx office (975 Walton Ave.) and identified common supervisors (e.g., Ephraim “Effi” Weiss); declarants described similar duties, hours, and unpaid overtime across buildings in Upper Manhattan and the Bronx.
- Plaintiffs moved for conditional certification under the FLSA §216(b), seeking notice to all current/former superintendents, porters, and handymen employed by the E & M Enterprise and tolling of the FLSA limitations period for opt-in plaintiffs.
- The court applied the Second Circuit’s two-step, “modest factual showing” standard for conditional certification and considered (a) whether defendants share common ownership/management and (b) whether a uniform unlawful policy existed for the proposed collective.
- The court granted conditional certification limited to superintendents, porters, and handymen supervised or managed out of the 975 Walton Avenue Bronx office (Upper Manhattan and Bronx properties), approved sending notice, limited the notice window to three years before mailing, and denied categorical equitable tolling for all opt-ins.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conditional certification / similarly situated scope | Plaintiffs: modest factual showing (declarations, payroll memos, centralized office) supports notice to all superintendents, porters, handymen across E & M | Defs: plaintiffs rely on integrated-enterprise theory without proving a common employer or citywide policy; evidence limited to few buildings/supervisors | Court: granted conditional certification but limited to employees supervised/managed from 975 Walton Ave. (Upper Manhattan & Bronx); denied broader citywide notice |
| Single employer / integrated-enterprise theory | Plaintiffs: documents, paystubs, memos, and depositions show centralized control and payroll (StaffPro) and unified management | Defs: challenge integrated-enterprise/joint-employer theory and scope; say evidence shows only limited supervisory reach | Court: at preliminary stage draws inferences for plaintiffs; found sufficient evidence to infer common ownership/management for purpose of notice but did not decide ultimate employer liability |
| Notice period length (3 years v. 6 years) | Plaintiffs: include six years to capture NYLL claims and economic efficiency | Defs: limit to three years (FLSA statute) to avoid notifying likely time-barred claimants | Court: chose three-year notice window (FLSA limitations) to avoid inefficiency/confusion; declined six-year notice absent stronger basis |
| Equitable tolling for opt-in plaintiffs | Plaintiffs: request tolling from filing (or motion) date so opt-ins can recover older claims | Defs: oppose categorical tolling; statutes limit exposure to three years; dispute diligence/extraordinary circumstances | Court: denied categorical equitable tolling because plaintiffs failed to show diligence by unnamed opt-ins; left individualized tolling requests open for adjudication after opt-in, but will mail notice only to those employed within three years of mailing |
Key Cases Cited
- Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989) (district courts may authorize notice to potential FLSA opt-ins as a case-management tool)
- Braunstein v. E. Photographic Labs., Inc., 600 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1979) (notice in FLSA actions is permissible despite statutory silence)
- Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537 (2d Cir. 2010) (endorses two-step conditional certification and characterizes notice as facilitating sending of court-approved notice)
- Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 2016) (describes the two-step FLSA collective-action process)
- Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66 (2013) (conditional certification under §216(b) is not equivalent to Rule 23 class certification)
- Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016) (describes opt-in mechanism and consequences of conditional certification)