Consumer Service Alliance of Texas, Inc. v. City of Dallas, Texas, 433 S.W.3d 796

CSAT, TitleMax, and Ace challenge a Dallas ordinance regulating credit access businesses (CABs) as preempted by Texas Finance Code provisions governing CSOs and CABs.
Ordinance 50-151, effective Jan. 1, 2012, regulates CABs with physical city locations and imposes restrictions on credit terms.
City filed pleas to the jurisdiction asserting lack of waiver of immunity and lack of jurisdiction to interpret a penal ordinance; appellants amended pleadings arguing preemption and invalidity.
Trial court granted the City’s plea to the jurisdiction; the court did not specify the ground for dismissal.
Appellants argued the Ordinance is unconstitutional or preempted, and sought declaratory relief and injunctive relief; the City argued standing, immunity, and lack of jurisdiction.
Texas Morales framework governs equity jurisdiction to review penal statutes/ordinances when enforcement is imminent but not yet prosecuted; the court analyzes whether such relief is appropriate.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether equity jurisdiction can enjoin or construe a penal ordinance before prosecution.	CSAT/TitleMax/Ace contended the ordinance is unconstitutional/preempted and merits equitable relief.	City argued there is no waiver of immunity and no proper preemption claim to justify equity relief.	No equity jurisdiction; enforcement imminent but insufficient to show invalidity or irreparable harm.
Whether appellants have vested property rights and irreparable harm to support equity jurisdiction.	Appellants have vested rights in inventory, business plans, and methods that will be harmed by the Ordinance.	Ordinance regulates terms of service, not a complete shutdown of lawful business; no irreparable harm shown.	Appellants failed to demonstrate irreparable harm to vested property rights; equity jurisdiction not established.
Whether the Declaratory Judgment Act provides subject matter jurisdiction in this civil case.	DJA allows declarations, including constitutionality, and immunity is waived.	DJA does not create jurisdiction; it is a procedural device within existing jurisdiction; no underlying jurisdiction here.	DJA cannot confer jurisdiction; trial court lacked jurisdiction to render declaratory relief.

Morales v. City of La Marque, 869 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1994) (equity will not intervene where enforcement imminent unless unconstitutional and causes irreparable harm)
City of Austin v. Austin City Cemetery Association, 28 S.W. 528 (Tex. 1894) (chilling effect and lack of remedy pre-prosecution justify equity review of penal statutes)
Passel v. Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist., 440 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. 1969) (courts of equity intervene in penal statutes only to avoid enforcement pending criminal proceedings)
Woodfield v. City of Dallas, 305 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010) (criminal statutes’ meaning should be determined in criminal court; equity relief limited)
Dallas Cnty. Housemovers Ass’n, 555 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1977) (adequate remedy at law and enforcement context affect jurisdiction to challenge ordinances)