26 F.4th 1
1st Cir.2022Background
- In 2019 Maine amended its Fair Credit Reporting Act with two laws: the Medical Debt Reporting Act (bars reporting medical debt <180 days delinquent; requires suppression/removal upon evidence of payment) and the Economic Abuse Debt Reporting Act (requires reinvestigation and removal when consumer shows debt resulted from economic abuse).
- The Consumer Data Industry Association (CDIA), representing credit-reporting agencies, sued Maine claiming both amendments are preempted by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), principally 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(E); CDIA also argued the economic-abuse law is preempted by § 1681t(b)(5)(C).
- The District Court, on a stipulated record and cross-motions, held both Maine laws preempted under § 1681t(b)(1)(E) and did not decide the § 1681t(b)(5)(C) argument.
- The First Circuit vacated and reversed the district court: it held § 1681t(b)(1)(E) is narrower than CDIA urged, preempting only state laws "with respect to" subject matter specifically regulated under 15 U.S.C. § 1681c, not all laws merely "relating to" information in consumer reports.
- The Court remanded for further proceedings to consider (1) whether the Maine laws are partly preempted insofar as they overlap with specific § 1681c provisions (including the veterans’ medical-debt exceptions in § 1681c(a)(7)-(8)), and (2) whether the Economic Abuse Debt Reporting Act is preempted by § 1681t(b)(5)(C).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of § 1681t(b)(1)(E) preemption | §1681t(b)(1)(E) bars any state law "relating to information contained in consumer reports," so Maine Amendments are fully preempted | The clause preempts only state laws "with respect to" subject matter regulated under the specific FCRA provisions listed (e.g., §1681c), so Maine may regulate outside those specific subject matters | The court held §1681t(b)(1)(E) is narrower: preemption extends only to state laws concerning the specific subject matters regulated under §1681c, not all laws merely "relating to" consumer-report information; vacated district judgment and remanded |
| Whether Medical Debt Act is preempted by §1681c(a)(5)/(b) or veterans' exceptions (§1681c(a)(7)/(8)) | CDIA: Maine’s medical-debt rules conflict with FCRA content/age rules and thus are preempted | Maine: §1681c’s list defines narrow subject matters; §1681c(a)(5) is an age-based exclusion and does not completely preempt state content regulation; veterans clauses are limited to veterans | The court found §1681c(a)(5) and (b) do not preempt the Maine laws in their entirety and held §§1681c(a)(7)-(8) govern only veterans’ medical debt; remanded to determine any partial preemption scope |
| Whether Economic Abuse Act is preempted by §1681t(b)(5)(C) (identity-theft rule in §1681c-2) | CDIA: economic-abuse definition overlaps identity theft and requires reinvestigation/blocking, so preempted by §1681t(b)(5)(C) | Maine: economic abuse differs from FCRA identity-theft definition and imposes different triggers/actions (reinvestigation/removal vs. mandatory blocking under §1681c-2) | The court did not decide; remanded for the district court to determine in the first instance whether §1681t(b)(5)(C) preempts Maine’s economic-abuse statute |
Key Cases Cited
- Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251 (2013) ("with respect to" narrows preemptive reach)
- Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002) (statutory text provides best evidence of preemptive intent)
- Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018) (describes express, conflict, and field preemption)
- Galper v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 802 F.3d 437 (2d Cir. 2015) (similar reading of FCRA preemption language)
- Tobin v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 775 F.3d 448 (1st Cir. 2014) (statutory-construction principles; congressional intent is touchstone)
- Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017) (every word in a statute matters; avoid surplusage)
- Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992) (when statute unambiguous, inquiry ends)
- Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (legislative intent may be explicit or implicit in statute’s structure)