34 F.4th 1260
11th Cir.2022Background
- Daniels obtained a mortgage and entered a 2009 loan modification: interest-only payments for 10 years with principal fixed at $189,911, then principal+interest per schedule.
- Loan later transferred; Wells Fargo refused interest-only payments and filed foreclosure; state court ultimately enforced the modification, sanctioned Wells Fargo, and ordered $60,808.83 of unpaid sums added to the end of the modification.
- After foreclosure litigation, Select Portfolio (servicer) sent monthly TILA-style statements that included a payment coupon, delinquency box, and the sentence “This is an attempt to collect a debt,” but allegedly overstated deferred/outstanding principal and monthly payment amounts.
- Daniels alleged the statements were harassing, false, and unfair under the FDCPA and Florida’s FCCPA; Select Portfolio moved to dismiss and the district court dismissed with prejudice, concluding the statements were TILA-required and not debt-collection communications.
- On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the 12(b)(6) dismissal and held Daniels plausibly alleged FDCPA/FCCPA coverage because the statements included extra debt-collection language and context suggested an attempt to collect a disputed debt; reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether monthly mortgage statements required by TILA can be "communications in connection with the collection of a debt" under the FDCPA/FCCPA | Daniels: statements (a) expressly said "attempt to collect a debt," (b) demanded payment amounts and a due date, (c) included late‑fee and payment coupon, and (d) came after contested foreclosure — so they plausibly seek to collect a debt | Select Portfolio: statements largely comply with TILA/regulations; TILA-mandated periodic statements should not be actionable under FDCPA/FCCPA as a matter of law | The court: Yes — TILA-required statements can plausibly be FDCPA/FCCPA communications when they include non‑TILA debt‑collection language and context indicates an attempt to collect or induce payment; plaintiff pleaded plausibly at Rule 12(b)(6) stage |
| Whether compliance with TILA/regulations bars FDCPA/FCCPA claims as a matter of law | Daniels: TILA compliance doesn't immunize servicers from FDCPA/FCCPA when statements go beyond TILA or are used to collect | Select Portfolio: conformity to TILA precludes FDCPA/FCCPA coverage; reliance on CFPB guidance | The court: No blanket preclusion. TILA and FDCPA must be harmonized; adherence to TILA does not automatically defeat FDCPA/FCCPA claims when statements contain additional debt‑collection language and context supports collection purpose |
| Effect of CFPB 2013 bulletin and similar authority (cease‑communications context) | Daniels: CFPB guidance is narrow; does not broadly exempt TILA statements from FDCPA | Select Portfolio: CFPB bulletin suggests required communications are excluded from FDCPA in many circumstances | The court: CFPB bulletin is non‑controlling and limited to the FDCPA "cease communications" context; it does not bar FDCPA claims categorically |
Key Cases Cited
- Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & Adams, LLP, 678 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2012) (a communication may be "in connection with" collection when it demands payment and threatens collection costs)
- Caceres v. McCalla Raymer, LLC, 755 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2014) (a letter stating the debtor was behind and that the communication was for collecting a debt was a communication related to collection)
- Green v. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC, [citation="766 F. App'x 777"] (11th Cir. 2019) (mortgage statements that contained only TILA‑required content did not rise to unlawful debt‑collection language)
- Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, 614 F.3d 380 (7th Cir. 2010) (a disclaimer identifying a communication as an attempt to collect a debt is not dispositive of FDCPA coverage)
- Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 1998) (historical rule that required certain disclosures changed by later FDCPA amendment; boilerplate language alone not dispositive)
- Heinz v. Carrington Mortg. Servs., LLC, 3 F.4th 1107 (8th Cir. 2021) (look to substance, not boilerplate; boilerplate mini‑Miranda does not automatically convert routine communications into FDCPA collection letters)
- Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007) (pleading‑stage standard for assessing allegations)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Ruth v. Triumph Partnerships, 577 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2009) (whether communication was sent in connection with collection is a question of objective fact)