941 F.3d 95
3rd Cir.2019Background
- On August 12, 2013, miner Robert Stern was crushed between two multi-ton pieces of equipment; he had severe pain, could not move a leg, and developed a hard, distended abdomen (signs consistent with possible internal bleeding).
- Mine personnel (including an EMT and the section supervisor) called for ambulance/Life Flight, placed Stern in a neck brace, and evacuated him; the mine coordinated transport, but Consol did not notify MSHA within 15 minutes.
- Consol notified MSHA about two hours after the accident; MSHA issued a citation under 30 C.F.R. § 50.10(b) for failing to timely report an injury "which has a reasonable potential to cause death."
- An ALJ upheld the citation and proposed $5,000 penalty; the Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Commission affirmed, applying an objective "reasonable person in the circumstances" standard and a "totality of the circumstances" inquiry, and enforcing the statutory $5,000 minimum.
- Consol petitioned for review arguing the Commission applied the wrong legal standard, that substantial evidence did not support the citation, and that the Commission was not bound by the statutory minimum penalty; the court denied the petition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper legal standard for §813(j)/§50.10(b) notification | Commission used an overly broad objective/totality test; Consol urged a higher, medically-grounded standard requiring proof the injury in fact had a reasonable potential to cause death | Statute/regulation and rulemaking support an objective "reasonable person in the circumstances" test, resolving reasonable doubts in favor of notification | Court upheld the Commission: objective reasonable-person standard, totality of circumstances, and resolve reasonable doubt in favor of notification |
| Role of post-hoc medical evidence | Consol: Commission relied improperly on after-the-fact medical conclusions; notification should depend on actual medical potential for death | Commission/MSHA: focus must be on what was known or should have been known at the scene; post-hoc medical proof is less probative | Court held the focus is on contemporaneous information; post-hoc medical evidence is less probative though it may be circumstantial evidence of what was known |
| Sufficiency of evidence that Consol should have reported within 15 minutes | Consol argued substantial evidence did not show responsible employees had information a reasonable person would view as life-threatening | MSHA pointed to: entrapment between large equipment, severe pain, immobility, distended abdomen (possible internal bleeding), calls for Life Flight, and employees' reactions | Court found substantial evidence supported the Commission’s factual finding that a reasonable operator would have concluded a reasonable potential for death existed |
| Applicability of $5,000 statutory minimum penalty | Consol argued the Commission could assess a lower penalty de novo | MSHA/Commission: §820(a)(2) mandates a minimum $5,000 for late notification and the Commission is bound by penalties in chapter 82; §820(a)(4) requires courts to apply at least the statutory minimum | Court held the Commission was bound by the statutory $5,000 minimum penalty |
Key Cases Cited
- Mainline Rock & Ballast, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 693 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2012) (applied a reasonable-person-in-the-circumstances test under §50.10)
- Cumberland Coal Res., LP v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 717 F.3d 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (discussing Mine Act purpose and scope)
- Cumberland Coal Res., LP v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 515 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2008) (standard for reviewing substantial evidence of MSHA findings)
- Big Ridge, Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 715 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 2013) (agency authority under Mine Act)
- Secretary of Labor v. Spartan Mining Co., 415 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Commission adjudicative role under Mine Act)
- Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994) (statutory purpose: protect miners)
- Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (principles of interpreting regulations and exhausting traditional tools)
- Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356 (2019) (starting point is the ordinary meaning of statutory text)