41 Cal.App.5th 794
Cal. Ct. App.2019Background:
- The Los Angeles County Public Guardian petitioned to be reappointed conservator of D.P. under the Lanterman–Petris–Short Act (LPS) after a one‑year conservatorship approached expiration.
- Jury trial was demanded by D.P.; trial began 81 days after his demand (statute requires commencement within 10 days).
- County’s expert, Dr. Loreta Mulokas, testified D.P. has schizoaffective disorder, lacks insight, sometimes behaves inappropriately, needs supervised psychiatric and medical care, and would decompensate without help; D.P. testified he would take medication and secure housing if released.
- The jury found D.P. presently gravely disabled due to a mental disorder; the trial court reappointed the County as conservator for one year.
- On appeal D.P. challenged (1) the late start of the jury trial, (2) an alleged instructional omission (failure to include unwillingness/incapacity to accept voluntary treatment as an element), and (3) sufficiency of the evidence.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (D.P.) | Defendant's Argument (County) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court lost jurisdiction because the jury trial did not commence within the 10‑day statutory period | 10‑day limit is mandatory; failure divested court of jurisdiction | 10‑day period is directory; court retains inherent jurisdiction | Directory; court retained jurisdiction (trial not void) |
| Whether the 71‑day delay violated due process | Delay deprived D.P. of a meaningful, timely hearing; requires reversal | No prejudice from delay; conservatorship term was not extended by the delay | Any due process error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; no reversible prejudice |
| Whether the court erred by omitting from the gravely disabled instruction the element that the proposed conservatee is unwilling or unable to voluntarily accept meaningful treatment | Statutory and CACI language require jury to find unwillingness/incapacity to accept treatment as part of gravely disabled determination | Statutory definition of gravely disabled (Welf. & Inst. Code §5008(h)(1)) focuses on inability to provide for basic needs; unwillingness to accept treatment appears elsewhere and is not an element | No error: omission was proper because §5008(h)(1) does not include unwillingness to accept treatment; jury was allowed to consider willingness as a factor elsewhere in instructions |
| Whether substantial evidence supported the gravely disabled verdict | Expert testimony did not show inability to provide basic needs—only a risk of noncompliance with meds | Treating psychiatrist’s opinion, based on treatment history and records, supported inference D.P. would decompensate and be unable to meet basic needs | Substantial evidence supports verdict; expert testimony alone was sufficient |
Key Cases Cited
- Conservatorship of John L., 48 Cal.4th 131 (overview of LPS Act procedures and due process in conservatorships)
- Conservatorship of James M., 30 Cal.App.4th 293 (10‑day trial commencement is directory, not jurisdictional)
- Conservatorship of Symington, 209 Cal.App.3d 1464 (statutory definition of gravely disabled does not require unwillingness to accept treatment)
- Conservatorship of Davis, 124 Cal.App.3d 313 (discussed jury instruction on willingness to accept treatment; factual context)
- Conservatorship of Walker, 196 Cal.App.3d 1082 (earlier case parsing interplay of ability to provide needs and willingness to accept treatment)
- Conservatorship of K.P., 39 Cal.App.5th 254 (recent decision following Symington’s reasoning)
- Conservatorship of Ben C., 40 Cal.4th 529 (due process balancing for conservatorship procedures)
- Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (civil commitment requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt)