Connolly v. Roden
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 9456
1st Cir.2014Background
- Massachusetts investigators began Connolly’s drug distribution/trafficking case in 2003, including surveillance showing suspected sales in his minivan.
- Two August 2004 controlled crack cocaine purchases by an undercover officer established quantities for the trafficking charge.
- A 2004 search of Connolly’s minivan yielded a 124.31-gram ball of cocaine wrapped in electrical tape.
- At trial in 2006, the State introduced field-tested drug identifications and the lab certificate stating the substance weighed 124.31 g, without calling the analyst.
- Connolly challenged only the Confrontation Clause issue after Melendez-Diaz; the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found Melendez-Diaz error harmless.
- The federal district court denied habeas relief under Brecht, concluding the error did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Framework for habeas harmless-error review | Connolly contends Fry requires Brecht despite AEDPA, making Esparza applicable. | State argues Brecht governs, and AEDPA deference controls since SJC applied harmless-error standard. | Brecht applies; framework may start with Esparza or Brecht as appropriate. |
| Whether the SJC reasonably applied Chapman harmless-error standard | Connolly argues SJC unreasonably applied Chapman by deeming error harmless. | State argues SJC’s analysis was reasonable given strong independent evidence of weight and drug identity. | SJC’s Chapman harmlessness determination was not unreasonable. |
| Prejudice from Melendez-Diaz certificate admission | Connolly claims admission of the lab certificates without cross-examination violated Confrontation Clause and prejudiced weight determination. | State contends weight was proven by other witnesses and jury observed the actual cocaine; certificates were harmless. | Harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given other evidence and jury access to the drugs themselves. |
Key Cases Cited
- Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (Supreme Court 2009) ( Sixth Amendment confrontation required cross-examination absent unavailability)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (Supreme Court 1967) (harmless-error standard on direct review)
- Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (Supreme Court 1993) (actual-prejudice standard for collateral review)
- Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112 (Supreme Court 2007) (AEDPA/Chapman framework; Brecht subsumes Esparza)
- Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12 (Supreme Court 2003) (two-layer AEDPA/Chapman framework described)
- United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court 1986) (pre-AEDPA harmless-error standard for collateral review)
- Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (Supreme Court 1946) (basis for Brecht’s substantial-and-injurious-effect standard)
- White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697 (Supreme Court 2014) (unreasonable application of clearly established federal law standard)
- Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (Supreme Court 2003) (objective-unreasonableness standard for AEDPA)