328 Conn. 134
Conn.2018Background
- Alfaro executed a $216,500 promissory note secured by a Bridgeport residence; plaintiff (Connecticut Housing Finance Authority) sued in foreclosure after missed payments.
- Alfaro answered, raising special defenses challenging plaintiff's standing; plaintiff moved for summary judgment and then withdrew that motion and voluntarily withdrew the foreclosure action under General Statutes § 52-80 before any merits hearing.
- Alfaro moved for attorney's fees under General Statutes § 42-150bb (reciprocal consumer-fee statute), claiming he had "successfully defended" the action; the trial court denied fees and the Appellate Court affirmed.
- The questions certified to the Supreme Court were whether a § 52-80 withdrawal can constitute a "successful defense" under § 42-150bb and who bears the burden of proof.
- The Supreme Court held that, in certain circumstances, a plaintiff’s voluntary withdrawal prior to a merits hearing may qualify as a successful defense under § 42-150bb and that once the defendant asserts the withdrawal resulted from his defense, the burden shifts to the commercial plaintiff to show the withdrawal was for other reasons.
- The case was remanded for the trial court to determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the withdrawal resulted from the defendant’s defense and, if so, to award reasonable attorney’s fees subject to the court’s assessment of reasonableness.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a plaintiff's voluntary withdrawal under § 52-80 before a merits hearing can constitute "successfully ... defends" under § 42-150bb | Withdrawal is an absolute right and, without a merits determination, does not make the defendant a successful defender eligible for fees | Withdrawal can reflect that the defendant's defense (e.g., contesting standing) caused plaintiff to abandon the suit, and thus can qualify as a successful defense | A voluntary withdrawal can, in certain circumstances, constitute a successful defense under § 42-150bb |
| Allocation of burden of proof when defendant claims withdrawal resulted from his defense | Plaintiff bears no special burden; defendant must prove withdrawal was caused by his defense | Once defendant plausibly asserts withdrawal resulted from his defense, burden shifts to plaintiff to prove withdrawal was for reasons unrelated to the defense | After defendant's showing, plaintiff must demonstrate by preponderance that withdrawal was unrelated to defendant's defense |
| Standard for awarding fees and limits to speculative awards | Fees should be denied absent a merits victory to avoid awards for meritless or passive defenses | Fees should be reasonable and tied to work that contributed to withdrawal; trial court may deny if little or no work causally connected | Fees may be awarded but must be reasonable and causally related to defendant counsel's work; trial court retains discretion to limit or deny fees |
| Whether this rule conflicts with federal "catalyst" doctrine (Buckhannon) or creates litigation overload | Allowing awards here effectively adopts a catalyst approach and encourages secondary litigation about reasons for withdrawal | The statute's text, history, and purpose justify a rebuttable presumption and allow plaintiff to rebut without full evidentiary trial; trial court can resolve on affidavits or hearing | The court rejected Buckhannon’s categorical bar as dispositive here and adopted a rebuttable-presumption framework with trial-court factfinding to avoid unnecessary relitigation |
Key Cases Cited
- Rizzo Pool Co. v. Del Grosso, 240 Conn. 58 (Conn. 1997) (discusses legislative history and reasonableness standard for fees under § 42-150bb)
- Aaron Manor, Inc. v. Irving, 307 Conn. 608 (Conn. 2013) (explains § 42-150bb's parity purpose between commercial parties and consumers)
- Anderson v. Latimer Point Management Corp., 208 Conn. 256 (Conn. 1988) (examines when fee awards under § 42-150bb are tied to the nature of the conduct that produced the result)
- Wallerstein v. Stew Leonard's Dairy, 258 Conn. 299 (Conn. 2001) (describes prevailing-party concept as material alteration of legal relationship)
- Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (U.S. 2001) (rejected catalyst theory for prevailing-party status but discussed by dissent and majority here)
- Thornber v. Fort Walton Beach, 568 So.2d 914 (Fla. 1990) (holds that voluntary dismissal can make defendant the prevailing party entitled to fees)
- Dean Vincent, Inc. v. Krishell Labs., 532 P.2d 237 (Or. 1975) (supports that voluntary nonsuit can result in defendant as prevailing party and allow fee award)