212 A.3d 348
Md.2019Background
- Tomekia Conaway: admitted multiple failures to complete court-ordered drug treatment while on supervised probation; after repeated deferrals and warnings the circuit court revoked probation and sentenced her to 15 years; she filed a "Notice of Appeal or Alternatively Application for Leave to Appeal;" Court of Special Appeals treated it as an application for leave and denied it.
- Luke Daniel Johnson: released with five years supervised probation after post-conviction relief and Alford plea; admitted several technical probation violations (travel and short-term unauthorized employment); trial judge found "public safety" risk and sentenced him to a term far exceeding JRA presumptive caps; he filed a notice of appeal and application for leave, which was dismissed by the Court of Special Appeals.
- Both petitioners argued the Justice Reinvestment Act (JRA), Md. Code, Crim. Proc. § 6-223(e)(4), grants a right of direct appeal (Title 12, Subtitle 3) when a judge finds adherence to JRA presumptive incarceration caps would create a public-safety risk and imposes an enhanced term.
- Maryland Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 12-302(g) provides that review of a circuit court order revoking probation "shall be sought by application for leave to appeal," creating a potential conflict with § 6-223(e)(4)’s use of the word "appeal."
- The Court of Appeals exercised certiorari, treated the statutory language and structure as plain, and resolved that appeals from revocation/sentencing under these circumstances must proceed by application for leave to appeal under § 12-302(g).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 6-223(e)(4) of the JRA grants a right of direct appeal when a court finds adherence to JRA caps would create a public-safety risk and imposes an enhanced sentence | (Conaway/Johnson) § 6-223(e)(4) uses the word "appeal" (not "application for leave to appeal") and therefore authorizes a direct appeal to the Court of Special Appeals | (State) § 12-302(g) unambiguously requires review of orders revoking probation by application for leave to appeal; § 6-223(e)(4) must be read consistent with Title 12 | Held: Probationers must seek appellate review by application for leave to appeal under § 12-302(g); § 6-223(e)(4) does not confer a direct-appeal right |
| Whether § 6-223(e)(4) is superfluous if interpreted to allow only leave-to-appeal review | (Johnson) Interpreting § 6-223(e)(4) to require leave would render it redundant given § 12-302(g) | (State) § 6-223(e)(4) clarifies that findings under § 6-223(e)(2)/(3) are subject to the appellate provisions of Title 12 (i.e., leave-to-appeal exception applies) | Held: § 6-223(e)(4) is not superfluous; it clarifies appealability subject to Title 12, including the leave-to-appeal rule |
| Whether Conaway’s certiorari petition was improvidently granted or her direct-appeal claim was unpreserved | (State) Conaway failed to preserve the direct-appeal claim and Court of Special Appeals’ summary denial bars certiorari | (Conaway) Issue is one of public importance and likely to recur, warranting review | Held: Court exercised discretion to reach the merits despite preservation/threshold arguments because the issue is important and recurring |
| Whether the trial record in Johnson’s case supports a finding that adhering to the presumptive JRA caps would create a public-safety risk (preservation and merits) | (Johnson) Evidence insufficient to rebut JRA presumptions; trial judge failed to follow required procedures | (State) Issue is not preserved for the Court of Appeals and remains properly before the Court of Special Appeals on Johnson’s pending application for leave | Held: Issue is waived before Court of Appeals for lack of preservation; left for Court of Special Appeals to consider on leave application |
Key Cases Cited
- Unger v. State, 427 Md. 383 (procedural preservation and appellate review of post-conviction matters)
- Stachowski v. State, 416 Md. 276 (jurisdiction to review Court of Special Appeals’ dispositions of leave applications)
- Monarch Acad. Baltimore Campus, Inc. v. Baltimore City Bd. of Sch. Commissioners, 457 Md. 1 (standard of review for appealability questions)
- Ingram v. State, 461 Md. 650 (cardinal rule: ascertain legislative intent; start with plain language)
- Spangler v. McQuitty, 449 Md. 33 (ambiguous statutory language and tools for interpretation)
- City of Bowie v. Prince George's County, 384 Md. 413 (avoid absurd results in statutory interpretation)
- Hernandez v. State, 108 Md. App. 354 (explaining why many leave-to-appeal applications are summarily denied)
- Nalls v. State, 437 Md. 674 (preservation rule requiring contemporaneous objection for appellate review)