212 A.3d 348
Md.2019Background
- Two consolidated appeals (Conaway and Johnson) ask whether the Justice Reinvestment Act (JRA) authorizes a direct appeal from a circuit court finding that a probationer’s technical violation justified incarceration beyond JRA presumptive caps, or whether review must proceed by application for leave to appeal under Md. Code, Courts & Judicial Proc. § 12-302(g).
- Conaway: admitted failing drug treatment (technical violation); after repeated chances, court revoked probation and sentenced her to 15 years. She filed a “Notice of Appeal or Alternatively Application for Leave to Appeal;” Court of Special Appeals treated it as an application for leave and denied relief; she sought certiorari to the Court of Appeals.
- Johnson: released on probation after post-conviction proceedings; admitted several technical violations; trial judge labeled them “public safety violations” and imposed an enhanced sentence (ten years). Johnson filed a direct appeal and an application for leave; the Court of Special Appeals dismissed the direct appeal; his application for leave remains pending; he sought certiorari here.
- The JRA (Md. Code, Crim. Proc. § 6-223) establishes rebuttable presumptive incarceration caps for technical probation violations (15, 30, 45 days for first, second, third violations) and provides that a finding that adherence to caps would create a risk is “subject to appeal under Title 12.”
- Md. Code, Courts & Judicial Proc. § 12-302(g) expressly requires that review of an order revoking probation be sought by application for leave to appeal (i.e., not by direct appeal), creating the statutory tension addressed by the Court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 6-223(e)(4) (JRA) creates a right of direct appeal from a finding that adherence to JRA caps would create a risk | Conaway/Johnson: § 6-223(e)(4) says such findings are “subject to appeal”; plain meaning gives a right to direct appeal (notice of appeal) rather than leave process | State: § 12-302(g) expressly requires applications for leave to appeal revocation orders; § 6-223(e)(4) must be read with Title 12 to require leave | Held: No direct appeal right; § 12-302(g) controls — review must be by application for leave to appeal; § 6-223(e)(4) is consistent with that scheme. |
| Whether the Court of Appeals should have declined certiorari as improvidently granted or refused to consider Conaway’s unpreserved appealability claim | Conaway: issue is of public importance and likely to recur; Court should decide despite preservation | State: certiorari improper because Court of Special Appeals denied leave without opinion and issue not preserved | Held: Court exercised discretion to consider Conaway’s claim on the merits as an important recurring issue; declined State’s jurisdictional objection. |
| Whether evidence supported trial court’s finding that Johnson’s technical violations created a public safety risk (sufficiency) | Johnson: evidence insufficient to rebut JRA presumption; enhanced sentence improper | State: issue not preserved before Court of Appeals; factual sufficiency for leave-court review remains | Held: Issue was not preserved for this Court; left for Court of Special Appeals in Johnson’s pending application for leave. |
| Due process / procedural errors in Johnson’s revocation/sentencing (failure to state revocation, denial of cross-examination of a witness) | Johnson: trial court erred procedurally and denied due process, warranting vacatur | State: procedural claims must be raised through leave-to-appeal process; not properly before this Court | Held: Not decided here; left for Court of Special Appeals via Johnson’s application for leave. |
Key Cases Cited
- Unger v. State, 427 Md. 383 (jurisdiction and review of Court of Special Appeals dispositions)
- Stachowski v. State, 416 Md. 276 (review of applications for leave to appeal; certiorari principles)
- Monarch Acad. Baltimore Campus, Inc. v. Baltimore City Bd. of Sch. Commissioners, 457 Md. 1 (standard of review for appealability questions)
- Ingram v. State, 461 Md. 650 (statutory interpretation principles)