Conaway v. Cincinnati Ins. Co.
2017 Ohio 8787
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Kyle Conaway was CEO of Lee’s Hydraulic & Pneumatic Services, LLC; a business auto policy issued to Lee’s (not to individuals) covered a 1999 Ford F‑450 (the truck).
- On Jan. 6–8, 2014 the truck froze/broke down while being driven to get fuel and became inoperable and subject to towing.
- Kyle and his father Darrin rode with employee Mark Schlachter in Mark’s minivan to Kyle’s home the night of the breakdown and, on Jan. 8, were passengers in Mark’s minivan driving to work when an accident ejected Kyle and Darrin; Darrin died and Kyle was injured.
- Kyle (individually and as administrator of Darrin’s estate) sued for a declaratory judgment that Cincinnati Insurance Co. (CIC) must indemnify under the business auto policy’s coverage for persons ‘‘occupying’’ a covered auto or a ‘‘temporary substitute’’ for a covered auto.
- The trial court found no coverage; the court of appeals reversed, holding the minivan was a temporary substitute for the inoperable truck because the truck was out of service and Kyle intended the minivan to serve as transportation to and from work until the truck was repaired.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a vehicle in which insureds were passengers is a “temporary substitute” under the business auto policy when the covered vehicle was inoperable | Kyle: the minivan was a temporary substitute for the truck because the truck was out of service and the minivan was used to get to/from work until repair | CIC: the minivan was not a substitute covered vehicle — plaintiffs were mere passengers and not using or authorized to use Mark’s vehicle as a substitute | Court of Appeals: minivan was a temporary substitute as a matter of law; policy covers injuries while "occupying" a temporary substitute when the covered vehicle is out of service |
| Whether the policy’s undefined phrase “temporary substitute” should be narrowly construed to require formal permission/use rights | Kyle: plain and ordinary meaning — a short‑term replacement suffices; no extra formalities required | CIC: coverage should be limited where the passenger lacked permission or authority to use owner’s vehicle as a substitute | Court: interpreted the term by its plain meaning and declined to read additional restrictions into the contract, resolving ambiguities for the insured |
Key Cases Cited
- Arnott v. Arnott, 972 N.E.2d 586 (Ohio 2012) (de novo review proper for legal issues in declaratory‑judgment insurance disputes)
- Laboy v. Grange Indemn. Ins. Co., 41 N.E.3d 1224 (Ohio 2015) (insurance policy interpretation is a question of law)
- Burris v. Grange Mut. Cos., 545 N.E.2d 83 (Ohio 1989) (contract language given plain and ordinary meaning; interpret disputed terms reasonably to effect parties’ intent)
- Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 374 N.E.2d 146 (Ohio 1978) (words and phrases in contracts are given ordinary meaning unless manifest absurdity or other meaning evident)