Compton v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 9:18-cv-01173-JMC

Plaintiff Carol Compton prevailed in a social-security appeal and moved for EAJA attorney’s fees and $20.04 in expenses; counsel sought $3,997.50 plus later-requested supplemental fees for reply time.
Defendant (Acting Commissioner) opposed fees, arguing the government’s litigation position was "substantially justified."
The underlying merits: the ALJ relied on VE testimony identifying jobs with GED Reasoning Level 2 while limiting plaintiff to "simple, routine tasks;" the district court found the ALJ failed to resolve an apparent conflict and remanded under Fourth Circuit precedent (Thomas).
At the time of the district court’s EAJA decision, most D.S.C. decisions treated GED Level 2 as conflicting with limits to simple, routine tasks; the Fourth Circuit later clarified that no apparent conflict exists in Lawrence.
The court found counsel’s requested fee amount reasonable, held the Commissioner’s litigation position was not substantially justified in light of then-governing district precedent, awarded $3,997.50 in EAJA fees plus $20.04 expenses, and denied the supplemental-fees request.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Commissioner’s litigation position was "substantially justified" for EAJA purposes	Commissioner’s position was not substantially justified given controlling district-court authority applying Thomas to similar facts	The Commissioner’s position was substantially justified; no apparent conflict between RFC "simple, routine tasks" and GED Reasoning Level 2	Not substantially justified; EAJA fees awarded
Whether supplemental fees for time spent filing a Reply should be awarded	Supplemental fees for two hours of reply time are reasonable and recoverable	Opposed; replies discouraged and fees not automatic	Denied supplemental fees (procedural timing and policy reasons)
Whether the ALJ failed to resolve an apparent conflict between the VE’s job identifications and the RFC	ALJ failed to ask the VE to explain how jobs with GED Level 2 fit a limitation to simple, routine tasks	ALJ’s decision was distinguishable from Thomas; no apparent conflict	Court found ALJ failed to resolve/clarify the conflict and failed to develop the record, warranting remand

Thomas v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2019) (explaining when an ALJ must obtain a VE explanation for apparent conflicts between RFC limits and DOT/GED job requirements)
Lawrence v. Saul, 941 F.3d 140 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding no apparent conflict between RFC limiting claimant to simple, routine, repetitive tasks and GED Reasoning Level 2)
Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (U.S. 2010) (EAJA fees belong to the litigant and are subject to Treasury offset)
Hyatt v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d 239 (4th Cir. 2002) (district courts have substantial discretion in fixing EAJA awards but must ensure reasonableness)
Smith v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1984) (government’s position must have a reasonable basis in law and fact to be "substantially justified")
Crawford v. Sullivan, 935 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1991) (government bears the burden to prove its litigation position was substantially justified)
Roanoke River Basin Ass’n v. Hudson, 991 F.2d 132 (4th Cir. 1993) (government may not mask an unreasonable position as substantially justified)