CompassCare v. Cuomo, 1:19-cv-01409

Background

Plaintiffs are three religious, pro-life organizations (CompassCare, NIFLA, First Bible) that employ or support pregnancy-care centers, schools, and ministries and require employees to adhere to faith-based codes of conduct.
They challenged New York Labor Law § 203-e (the "Boss Bill"), which (1) forbids employers from discriminating or retaliating against employees for their or dependents’ "reproductive health decision making," (2) bans employer-required waivers of those rights, and (3) requires employers who provide employee handbooks to include a statutory notice of employee rights.
Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking a pre-enforcement declaratory judgment and a preliminary injunction, alleging violations of expressive association, free speech (compelled speech and viewpoint), free exercise/religious autonomy, and due process (vagueness).
Defendants (state officials) moved to dismiss and opposed the injunction; the court decided the motions on the briefs without argument.
Ruling: the court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the handbook/notice requirement (§ 203-e(6)) as compelled speech; it denied injunctive relief on the other claims and granted dismissal as to those counts (except the free-speech claim insofar as it challenged the notice provision).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Expressive association — does §203-e impermissibly force associations to retain employees who contradict their message?	§203-e will force Plaintiffs to associate with employees who act or believe contrary to Plaintiffs’ pro-life religious mission, chilling advocacy.	Law regulates employment conduct to prevent discrimination; volunteers and ministers are unaffected; burdens are incidental and subject to rational-basis review.	Plaintiffs failed to show a substantial, direct burden; rational-basis suffices. Claim dismissed and injunction denied.
Free exercise / religious autonomy — does §203-e target religion or bar religious organizations from ordering internal affairs?	Statute was motivated by hostility to religious employers (legislative debate cited Hobby Lobby) and thus is non-neutral and not generally applicable; it improperly restricts religious autonomy in hiring/firing.	Statute is neutral and generally applicable; ministerial exception remains available; no blanket exemption necessary.	Legislative record shows secular purpose (protecting reproductive autonomy); statute is generally applicable and survives rational-basis review. Claim dismissed and injunction denied.
Free speech — compelled speech (notice in handbooks §203-e(6))	Requiring Plaintiffs to include notice in their handbooks forces them to communicate a message they oppose and chills internal religious speech.	Notice is neutral, factual, and serves the compelling interest of preventing discrimination and protecting privacy; applies to all employers who use handbooks.	Court found the notice is compelled speech subject to strict scrutiny and that the State has less intrusive alternatives; substantial likelihood plaintiffs will succeed on this claim. Preliminary injunction granted as to §203-e(6).
Free speech — waiver ban and content/viewpoint arguments	The no-waiver provision and statute as a whole suppress Plaintiffs’ viewpoint and restrict recruiting and speech about faith-based standards.	The waiver ban is content-neutral, regulates conduct (no contractual waivers of statutory rights), and is justified to prevent circumvention.	Waiver provision is content-neutral and survives intermediate scrutiny; plaintiffs’ viewpoint/discrimination claims fail here. Claim denied/dismissed.
Vagueness — is "reproductive health decision making" unconstitutionally vague?	Phrase is undefined and fails to give fair notice or enforceable standards; invites arbitrary enforcement.	Statute clarifies scope by expressly including "decisions to use or access a particular drug, device, or medical service," and employment-discrimination statutes are necessarily general.	Court concluded the statute gives sufficient notice for an ordinary employer and is not unconstitutionally vague. Claim dismissed with prejudice.

Key Cases Cited

Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (First Amendment protects expressive association, including a right not to associate)
Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (First Amendment protects associative rights in certain organizational contexts)
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (ministerial exception bars application of employment-discrimination law to certain ministerial positions)
Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (compelled professional speech/notice requirements subject to heightened scrutiny)
Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (compelled speech doctrine: government may not force speakers to utter messages they disagree with)
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (neutral laws of general applicability that incidentally burden religion need only a rational-basis justification)
Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (strict scrutiny applies to content-based regulations of speech)
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (free exercise strict-scrutiny exemption analysis)