Compass Bank v. Dunn, 196 Conn.App. 43

Compass Bank sued to foreclose a mortgage against Jeffrey and Diane Dunn; summons/complaint served March 30, 2017.
Plaintiff served a written demand under Practice Book §13-19 (disclosure of defense). Defendants timely filed a written disclosure asserting lack of knowledge/standing and stating counsel believed a bona fide defense existed.
Plaintiff moved for default under §13-19, arguing the disclosed challenge to standing was not a proper defense and was offered to delay the action. The defendants objected.
The trial court granted default for failure to disclose a proper defense, denied reargument, and another judge entered judgment of strict foreclosure; defendants appealed.
The Appellate Court reviewed whether a §13-19 default may be based on the court’s view that the disclosed defense is legally insufficient, rather than on counsel’s good faith or the sham/frivolous nature of the disclosure.
The court held the trial court erred: §13-19 requires inquiry into counsel’s belief and intention (per Jennings v. Parsons); courts may not resolve legal sufficiency at the disclosure stage unless the defense is clearly sham/frivolous or made in bad faith.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a trial court may enter default under Practice Book §13-19 because a disclosed defense is not a "valid" defense to foreclosure	The Dunns’ standing challenge is not a defense to foreclosure; the disclosure was an improper delay tactic, so default is warranted	Defendants timely complied with §13-19: counsel stated belief in a bona fide defense and described its substance; court should not assess legal sufficiency at this stage	Reversed: court cannot enter default merely because it deems the disclosed defense legally insufficient; court must assess counsel’s good faith and intent and leave legal sufficiency for regular proceedings unless the disclosure is sham/frivolous or made in bad faith
Whether the trial court complied with Jennings v. Parsons when granting default	Implicitly argued trial court’s evaluation of validity justified default	Defendants argued Jennings requires findings about counsel’s belief/good faith, which the court did not make	Held: The court made no findings on counsel’s good faith/intention as Jennings requires, so default was improper

Jennings v. Parsons, 71 Conn. 413 (Conn. 1899) (§13-19 disclosure requires court inquiry into counsel’s belief and intention; court may not decide legal sufficiency except for sham/frivolous defenses)
A.D.C. Contracting & Supply Corp. v. Thomas J. Riordan, Inc., 176 Conn. 579 (Conn. 1979) (default under disclosure rule permissible where defendant conceded the disclosed defense was invalid)
Meadowbrook Center, Inc. v. Buchman, 328 Conn. 586 (Conn. 2018) (rules of practice interpreted using statutory-interpretation principles)