2016 IL App (1st) 150425
Ill. App. Ct.2016Background
- ComEd filed to revise its delivery service formula rate (Rate DSPP), proposing that the "formula rate structure" include the two summary schedules (FR A-1 and FR A-1 REC) together with all supporting schedules and appendices listed in the tariff.
- The Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC) staff proposed a narrower definition: only Schedules FR A-1 and FR A-1 REC (the tariff sheets that set format and organization).
- The ICC’s interim order approved a housekeeping change, denied a compliance change, and opened a Phase 2 to define "formula rate structure" for ComEd.
- At hearing, ComEd argued the entire set of schedules/appendices are part of the formula; staff, the Attorney General, and CUB argued only the two summary schedules are the structure.
- The ICC adopted staff’s narrow definition, holding that only changes to FR A-1 and FR A-1 REC must be made via section 9-201 proceedings; other supporting schedules can be updated in annual FRU dockets.
- ComEd appealed, arguing the ICC’s definition is contrary to law and unsupported by the evidence; the appellate court reviewed for reasonableness and deference because the statutory term is ambiguous, and affirmed the ICC.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (ComEd) | Defendant's Argument (ICC/Staff) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| What is the meaning of "formula rate structure" for §16-108.5(c)/(d)? | The structure includes the two summary schedules plus the full set of supporting schedules and appendices expressly incorporated by reference in the tariff. | The structure is limited to the two tariffed summary schedules (FR A-1 and FR A-1 REC) because those are the only documents the Commission expressly approved in the tariff. | Court: Term is ambiguous; give deference to ICC. Affirmed ICC: only FR A-1 and FR A-1 REC constitute the formula rate structure. |
| Standard of review for ICC’s statutory interpretation and factual finding | ComEd urged de novo review of the statutory construction. | ICC argued for deference because the statute is ambiguous and ICC has expertise. | Court: Term ambiguous -> substantial weight to ICC interpretation; factual findings reviewed for manifest weight/substantial evidence. |
Key Cases Cited
- Continental Mobile Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 269 Ill. App. 3d 161 (1994) (standard for overturning ICC factual findings as contrary to manifest weight)
- Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 398 Ill. App. 3d 510 (2009) (discussing deference to ICC and appellate review limits)
- Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 184 Ill. 2d 391 (1998) (deference to administrative expertise in utility regulation)
- Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education, 142 Ill. 2d 54 (1990) (use of statutory consequences and entire act to discern legislative intent)
- Ameropan Oil Corp. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 298 Ill. App. 3d 341 (1998) (rejecting speculation as basis for ICC decision)
- Allied Delivery System, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 93 Ill. App. 3d 656 (1981) (procedural review of ICC reasoning)
- Business & Professional People for the Public Interest v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 136 Ill. 2d 192 (1989) (ICC orders not res judicata across proceedings)
- People ex rel. Hartigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 148 Ill. 2d 348 (1992) (manifest weight standard for agency factual findings)
- Quality Saw & Seal, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 374 Ill. App. 3d 776 (2007) (deference to reasonable agency interpretation of ambiguous statute)