Comolli v. Huntington Learning Centers, Inc.
683 F. App'x 27
| 2d Cir. | 2017Background
- Plaintiffs Dina Comolli, Christine Holliday, and Sandra Williams participated in a 2011 television commercial for Huntington and later sued under N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 51 for using their likenesses without written consent.
- On the day of the shoot each plaintiff completed a form release styled as a business letter: salutation, three-paragraph consent language, valediction "Very Truly yours," a printed-name instruction line beneath that valediction, contact-information lines, and a separate left-justified signature line (the "Disputed Signature Line") with an instruction about parent/guardian signatures if under 21.
- Comolli and Williams printed their names under the valediction but left the Disputed Signature Line blank; Holliday both printed her name and signed the Disputed Signature Line.
- Defendants later produced authentic releases; plaintiffs do not contest authenticity but contend they did not intend to execute the releases (Comolli, Williams) and Holliday contends she may recover if Williams did not consent (unionization theory).
- The district court granted summary judgment to defendants; the Second Circuit reviewed de novo and affirmed, holding the releases constituted written consent under New York law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the printed-name entries (without a signature on the Disputed Signature Line) constitute "written consent" under N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 50 | Comolli/Williams: printing name and contact info does not show intent to execute release; they did not intend to consent | Huntington: the releases are formatted as business letters and the printed names under the valediction objectively manifest assent | Held: Printed names under the valediction, plus conduct (performing, invoicing, cashing payment), objectively manifest written consent; no genuine issue of material fact |
| Whether subjective intent controls contract formation for the releases | Plaintiffs: they subjectively did not intend to execute releases | Defendants: contract formation is judged by objective manifestations, not subjective intent | Held: Court applied objective-test for contract formation and rejected plaintiffs’ subjective-intent claim |
| Whether circumstantial facts (disorganized shoot, storage issues, expert testimony) raise a triable issue | Plaintiffs: point to expert testimony and facts about shoot/storage to create doubt about assent | Defendants: such facts are speculative and insufficient to defeat summary judgment | Held: Court found those inferences speculative and insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact |
| Whether Holliday retains a claim if Williams lacked consent (unionization argument) | Holliday: Williams’ lack of written consent would require unionization and could affect Holliday’s recovery | Defendants: Williams provided written consent; the premise fails | Held: Court deemed Holliday’s alternate theory dependent on rejected contention and did not reach it |
Key Cases Cited
- Coppola v. Bear Stearns & Co., 499 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2007) (standard for de novo review of summary judgment and genuine-dispute analysis)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (definition of genuine dispute of material fact for summary judgment)
- Brown Bros. Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Beam Const. Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 397 (N.Y. 1977) (contract formation judged by objective manifestations of intent)
- Robinson v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 781 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2015) (non-movant must do more than raise metaphysical doubt to defeat summary judgment)
- Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1986) (party may not rely on mere speculation to overcome summary judgment)
- Cory v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 592 N.Y.S.2d 6 (App. Div. 1993) (written consent satisfies § 50 even if not in form of a separate written contract)